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Mines are relatively cheap weapons that can be employed in significant quantity 
by any country with even a modest military budget, and can be very effective at severely 
damaging or sinking ships or denying maritime access to an area. In this thesis, 
simulation and analytical models are formulated and studied to investigate the benefits 
and risks of mine avoidance, without object classification capability, under circumstances 
that include imperfect sensors and false targets. Two models of mine avoidance 
maneuvering are formulated, with increasing complexity in both their analytical and 
simulation implementations. With both formulations, results are obtained and analyzed to 
produce tables showing the probability of successful minefield transit as a function of 
sensor probability of detection vs. density of mine and non-mine, mine-like bottom 
objects, and the false alarm rate. The tables show the range of those parameter values for 
which mine avoidance maneuvering improves the probability of safe transit, and the 
values for which mine avoidance maneuvering reduces the probability of safe transit.  
The decrease is attributable to the fact that mine avoidance maneuvering increases the 
distance traveled in the minefield and the consequent risk of damage or destruction by an 
undetected mine. Quantitative results for the increased distance traveled in the minefield 
are also presented. Finally, a comparison of the two models of mine avoidance 
maneuvering show, not surprisingly, that the results of the simpler model are not good 
approximations of the results obtained with the more complex model, suggesting that 
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A classical mine is a weapon that cannot move and can only attack a target by 
self-destructing.  This is a rather primitive approach to warfare.  Being required neither to 
move nor to project power at a distance, mines are relatively cheap. A mine may cost 
thousands of dollars while a missile or torpedo of equivalent destructive power would 
cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.  Mines can be employed in significant quantity by 
any country with even a modest military budget, as they are cheap and available on the 
international arms market.  They can be very effective.  As seen from the above sentences, 
a mine is a serious weapon in naval warfare. A minefield can destroy ships and delay 
access to an area.  
In this thesis, simulation and analytical models are formulated and studied to 
investigate the benefits and risks of mine avoidance under circumstances that include 
imperfect sensors and false targets. False targets can be non-mine, mine- like bottom 
objects (NOMBOs), or false alarms generated by random noise in the sensor’s receiver. 
Two models of mine avoidance maneuvering are formulated, with increasing complexity 
in both their analytical and simulation implementations. One is the Simple Minefield  
Transit (SMT) Model, and the other is the Minefield Object Avoidance Maneuver 
(MOAM) Model. 
The minefield is considered a rectangle that is, for all practical purposes, infinitely 
wide; i.e., a ship cannot simply go around the minefield – it must cross it to accomplish 
its mission.  The distance across the minefield is a fixed, finite distance, L. The positions 
of mines and NOMBOs in the minefield are modeled as independent, homogeneous 
spatial Poisson processes (Ross, 2000), with intensity parameters that represent the 
average number of mines or NOMBOs, respectively, per unit area in the minefield.  
In the Simple Minefield Transit (SMT) model, when the ship encounters a mine 
or NOMBO, or the sensor gives a false alarm, the ship retraces its route back to the entry 
 xvi 
to the minefield, moves to a different location and attempts to cross the field again along 
a straight path that does not intersect any of its previous attempts  
In the MOAM model, when the ship encounters a detected mine or NOMBO, or 
the sensor gives a false alarm, the ship attempts to go around the location of the detected 
object. The ship goes an avoiding distance to the right (for illustration, could alternatively 
go to the left).  If the ship does not detect a mine or NOMBO, or the sensor does not give 
a false alarm and the ship survives the distance, then it once again proceeds across the 
field.  If the ship encounters a mine or NOMBO, or the sensor gives a false alarm while 
going to the right, the ship backtracks and tries an avoiding distance to the left; if it does 
not detect an object and the sensor does not give a false alarm and survives during this 
avoidance path, it once again proceeds across the field.  If the ship encounters a detected 
mine or NOMBO, or the sensor gives a false alarm in both directions and the ship 
survives, the ship goes back to the entry to the field, moves to a different location and 
starts over again. 
The simulations are used for two purposes in this thesis.  First, the results for 
probability of safe transit are compared with the analytical model results for verification 
of both formulations.  In addition, the simulation enhances the analytical results by 
providing additional information such as the distribution of the distance traveled in the 
minefield and counts of path retracing.  
The simulations are written in the JAVA programming language, and are run by 
typing the appropriate input parameters in the command window. The simulations 
consider three special cases determined by the input parameters.  The first case is a mine 
only case.  This case is simulated when the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs and the rate 
of false alarms are zero.  The second special case is a mine and NOMBO case.  This is 
simulated when the rate of false alarms is set equal to zero.  Finally, the third case is a 
mine, NOMBO, and false alarm case.  This is simulated when all three rate parameters 
are positive.  The input parameters include the rate of occurrence of mines, the rate of 
occurrence of NOMBOs, the rate of false alarms, Y-axis distance of the minefield (L), the 
mine actuation width of the ship, and the probability of the detection of mines and 
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NOMBOs by the sensor onboard the ship. In particular, the ROC 1  curve model 
determines the false alarm rate. This model computes the probability of a false alarm (Pf) 
based on a given probability of detecting a mine or NOMBO (Pd), and the rate of 
occurrence of false alarms is calculated by using the Pf. [Appendix A] (Pilnick, 2002). 
The output of the simulations include the following: the estimated distribution and 
mean of the conditional distance traveled given unsuccessful transit; the estimated 
distribution and mean of the conditional distance traveled given transit is successful; the 
estimated distribution and mean of the total distance traveled; the mean number of 
retracings (returns to the entry to the minefield); and the percentage of simulation runs 
resulting in successful transit, which provides a statistical estimate for the probability of 
safe transit. 
Particular issues studied with both the analytical and simulation models are the 
probability of safe passage across the minefield and the distance traveled to successfully, 
or unsuccessfully, transit the field. The histograms of distances traveled suggest that even 
if the ship successfully transits the minefield, it may need to transit a substantial distance 
while doing so.  The distance traveled is a function of the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs 
and the rate of occurrence of false alarms. Thus, even if a ship transits the field 
successfully, it may take a surprisingly long time. The simulation promotes valuable 
understanding of this situation. 
A primary Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) under investigation is the probability 
of a safe minefield transit, and if, and how, the change of rate of the occurrence of 
NOMBOs ( )Ol  or detection index (d) affects this probability.  
The results of this study demonstrate that if NOMBOs exist in the minefield, the 
probability of a safe minefield transit does not always increase with increasing sensor 
probability of detection, but sometimes decreases. That is, since detected NOMBOs and 
false alarms cause the ship to travel greater distances within the field, it is possible for 
use of the sensor to decrease the probability of successful transit of the minefield. 
However, if the probability of detection is high enough, then the advantage of being able 
                                                 
1 ROC: Receiver Operating Characteristic. 
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to detect an encountered mine outweighs the disadvantage of a longer distance traveled. 
When there are no NOMBOs in the field, and the probability of detection increases, even 
if false alarms occur and the rate of occurrence of false alarms is great, the probability of 
a safe minefield transit always increases. In other words, if it is possible to guarantee that 
no NOMBOs exist in the minefield, sensors must be used to transit the minefield, even 
though the detection index is low, because the probability of a safe minefield transit with 
a sensor is always greater than that with no sensor.  However, in the real world, this 
situation seldom occurs.  Thus, how can the ship transit the minefield safely?  First, the 
rate of occurrence of unknown NOMBOs in the minefield should be reduced.  The rate of 
occurrence of mines is not controllable since enemy forces deploy mines.  However, 
surveying the bottom continuously during peacetime and keeping data about the locations 
of objects on the bottom can reduce the rate of occurrence of unidentified NOMBOs.  
Next, reducing the rate of false alarms can be accomplished by improving the sensor 
signal-to-noise ratio. 
In this study, the capability to classify an object that is detected, even with some 
error, is not considered. Thus, when the ship detects something in the minefield, it must 
attempt to avoid the detected object without classification. However, the results of the 
mine only case and the mine plus false alarm case can be used to study the advantage of 
having a perfect classification capability for mines and NOMBOs.  
Finally, a comparison of the two models of mine-avoidance maneuvering shows 
that the results of the simpler SMT model do not agree with the results obtained with the 
more complex MOAM model, suggesting that even greater complexity in maneuver 
modeling may be desirable for some purposes. The results of the simpler model are more 
pessimistic, which is not surprising. 
Successful use of the mine avoidance tactic without a sensor that can accurately 
distinguish between mines and NOMBOs may be limited to those situations for which the 
rate of occurrence of NOMBOs and false alarm rates are small. Since similar conclusions 
are obtained from both models, the results suggest that these conclusions usually apply 
and are not artifacts of the model representation of avoidance maneuvering. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
When a $1,000 mine can damage so severely a $1,000,000,000 ship … it 
is time to do something about it. 
Admiral Edney, 1991 
A classical mine is a weapon that cannot move and can only attack a target by 
blowing itself up.  This is a rather primitive approach to warfare.  Being required neither 
to move nor to project power at a distance, mines are relatively cheap.  A mine may cost 
thousands of dollars while a missile or torpedo of equivalent destructive power would 
cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.  Mines can be employed in significant quantity by 
any country with even a modest military budget, as they are cheap and available on the 
international arms market.  They can be very effective. 
During the Korean War, North Korea, with no real navy of its own, was able to 
mine its harbors and coasts with impunity.  The Soviets provided devices and expertise, 
and the North Koreans used simple junks and sampans to deploy thousands of deadly 
explosives, often at night, over hundreds of square miles.  According to Arnold S. Lott in 
the “Most Dangerous Sea” (1959), Soviet personnel not only trained North Koreans and 
supervised mine assembly, but actually laid magnetic mines off Korean coasts.  
Although the primary purpose of North Korea’s mines was to obstruct U.S. troop 
and supply movements, plenty of direct damage was also inflicted.  On Sept. 26, 1950, 
the destroyer Brush triggered a mine and nine men were killed.  Four days later, the 
destroyer Mansfield set off another mine and five more men were killed. 
In October 1950, an amphibious task force of 250 ships with around 50,000 troops 
embarked and steamed back and forth outside the approaches to the Wonsan harbor in 
North Korea.  D-day for the landing at Wonsan had been set for 20 October, but a week 
after D-day, the task force still marched and countermarched offshore while food supplies 
ran low.  The landing was delayed because the approaches to Wonsan were mined.  The 
minefield in Wonsan harbor inspired RADM Alan Smith to say, 
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The US Navy has lost control of the sea to a nation without a Navy, using 
pre-World War I weapons laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of 
the birth of Christ. (Melia, 1991) 
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, who was then CNO, later explained, 
… When you can’t go where you want to, when you want to, then you 
haven’t got command of the sea.  And command of the sea is a rock-
bottom foundation for all our war plans.  We’ve been very submarine-
conscious and air-conscious. Now we’re getting mine-conscious, 
beginning last week. 
That minefield delayed the planned landing at Wonsan by over a week.  The 
United States Navy lost four minesweepers in the process of clearing the mines, and 
several other ships were also sunk or damaged. (Hartmann, 1979) 
During the Gulf War, Iraqi mining operations in the coastal waters and 
prospective assault beaches directly influenced plans for possible amphibious operations.  
ADM Arthur (COMUSNAVCENT) said the following about Iraq’s use of mines in the 
Gulf War, 
Iraq successfully delayed and might have prevented an amphibious assault 
on Kuwait’s assailable flank, protected a large part of its force from the 
effects of naval gunfire, and severely hampered surface operations in the 
northern Arabian Gulf, all through the use of naval mines. (Mardola and 
Schneller, 1998) 
During Operation Desert Storm, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II said, 
I believe there are some fundamentals about mine warfare we should not 
forget. Once mines are in place, they are quite difficult to get rid of.  That 
is not likely to change. I think that it is probably going to get worse, 
because mines are going to get more sophisticated. 
It took several months for the allied nations to clear the Iraqi minefields even 
when their location and nature were revealed after the war. 
As seen from the above quotations, a mine is a serious weapon in naval warfare.  
A minefield can destroy ships and delay access to an area.  
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The following mine avoidance tactic has been proposed for a ship to cross a 
minefield.  A ship uses a sensor to locate mine- like objects2 and then maneuvers to avoid 
the detected objects.  It is hoped that this mine avoidance tactic will result in safe transit 
of the field in a timely manner using fewer resources than either mine sweeping or mine 
hunting.   
In this thesis, models to investigate the benefits/risks of mine avoidance which 
includes imperfect sensors and false targets are formulated and studied.  Particular issues 
studied with the models include the probability of safe passage through the minefield and 
the distance traveled to successfully and unsuccessfully pass through the field. The 
results of this thesis provide guidance as to when mine avoidance tactics can be used 
rather than the more resource intensive and time consuming tactics of mine hunting or 
mine sweeping.  
B. MINEFIELD TRANSIT MODEL 
This thesis models the effect of a sensor used by a minefield transiting ship using 
a mine avoidance tactic without object classification through analytical models and 
simulation to analyze the results of transiting either with or without using the sensor.  
For instance, without sensors, the optimum path for a ship to transit a minefield 
may be by a straight line at the field's narrowest point.  When a sensor is present, the 
probability of safe transit may be higher or lower than in the no sensor case, depending 
on how the sensor is employed.  The results of this thesis provide guidance as to when 
mine avoidance tactics can be used rather than the more resource intensive and time 
consuming tactics of mine hunting or mine sweeping. 
The probability of safe transit as a function of the sensor’s performance, minefield 
density, and false target density is assessed, for example, when a sensor with a specified 
detection probability confronts a field of x mines/mile2 and y false targets/mile2,  
· What is the probability of safe transit?  
· What combinations of parameters increase/decrease the probability of safe  
passage? 
                                                 
2 Mine-like objects include both mine and non-mine, mine-like bottom objects. 
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1. Mine Distribution in a Minefield 
An initial model for the positions of mines in a minefield is the spatial Poisson 
process (Ross, 2000). 
Assume mines are distributed in the field according to a homogeneous spatial 
Poisson Process with rate l , where l  is the expected number of mines/unit area. 
· The number of mines in disjoint regions are independent random variables 
· There is at most one mine for each location. (no stack) 
Let N(A) be the number of mines in subregion A. The probability that N(A) equals 
n is modeled as 
{ } [ ]( ) ( )( )
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Assume mines are distributed according to a Poisson process with rate l  
 
 






The total area of the field is represented by ( )a R .  The total region which has area 
( )a R  is represented by R . The total number of mines in the region is modeled as a 
Poisson random variable with mean ( )a Rl * . 
 
2. Initial Minefield Transit Model 
As a preliminary step to modeling imperfect sensors and mine- like objects, an 
initial model considers a special case of a perfect sensor in order to examine models for 
alternate paths through the minefield of distance L across that take into account a simple 
diversion tactic that is required as mines are encountered. Assume the ship sees all mines 
it encounters and no NOMBOs3 and there are no false alarms.  That is, the ship’s sensor 
is perfect.  Thus, the ship will successfully pass through the field.  However, it may be 
delayed.  Assume the ship has a mine actuation width w (w/2 is the distance between the 
mine and the center of the ship). 
 
Figure 2.   Minefield Transit. 
                                                 








What is the probability that the ship can travel more than distance d until it 
encounters the first mine? 
0
| | ( * ) ( )( | |){ } { ( ) 0}
0!
A w d w dAP D d P N A e e el l l
l- - -> = = = = =  
D = distance until ship encounters the first mine 
A = rectangle with length d and width w 
|A| = area of A 
L = distance of the minefield 
As a special case, the probability that the ship does not encounter any mines while 
transiting the minefield is 
P{encounter 0 mines while transiting minefield} = ( )w Le l-  
Now consider that the ship encounters a mine at L>d.  In this case, the ship will 
evade the mine by changing course to the left or right and proceed by h .  If no other 
mines are encountered at the proceeding course, the ship will change course to the north 
and proceed another distance, L-d, to complete the minefield transit.  
When the ship encounters a mine, one evasive action is as follows: 
h = avoiding distance; distance moved to the left or right to go around perceived mines 
h1, h2 = actual distance proceeded to the left or right4 
 
                                                 
4  The avoiding distance and the actual distances proceeded to the left or right during avoidance 
maneuvers are measured from a point w/2 distance units left or right of the original track, respectively.  
This detail is omitted from the illustrations of the mine avoidance maneuver for clarity. 
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Figure 3.   Minefield Transit Case 3.b.(1). 
 
 
Minefield transit procedure  
1. Start minefield transit 
2. Encounter no mine Ú continue north (distance traveled = L) 
3. Encounter mine going north across minefield (detection distance ³ w/2) Ú Turn 
west (for illustration, could alternatively turn east)  
a. Encounter no mine by h  Ú turn north. 
b. Encounter mine at h1< h  Ú reverse the direction. 
(1) Encounter no mine by h1+ h  Ú turn north. 
(2) Encounter mine at h2< h  Ú go back to the start position of the minefield 











Figure 4.   Minefield Transit Case 3.b.(2). 
 
P{successfully evade the mine in the first direction} = 
P{no mine in area w* h } = hwe l-  
P{successfully evade the mine} = { ( ) {
1st direction 2nd direction
success success1st direction
failure 












Figure 5.   Flow Chart of Minefield Transit with a Perfect Sensor. 
 
This model does not depend on which direction the first avoiding maneuver takes 
– it could be arbitrarily chosen. 
If the evasion is unsuccessful, the ship could return to the start position of the 
field and start again from another entering place. 
Start minefield transit (North) 
Encounter mine? 
Turn West (or East) and proceed h1 
Encounter mine 
at h1< h ? 
Reverse the direction 
And proceed h1+h2 
End 
Encounter mine by 
h2< h ? 








Choose new start point 
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In this case, the total traveled distance of the first unsuccessful trial is 
2d+2h1+2h2. 
Restart on a path that will not overlap the first area searched. 
C1(d) is a successful event after the first avoided direction which occurred a 
distance d into the field. 
P{success through remainder of field | D1=d, 1st evading direction is success5} = 
P{no mines in rectangle of area w*(L-d)} = )( dLwe --l  
P{success through remainder of field | D1=d, first evading direction is a failure,  
second evading direction is a success6} 
= )( dLwe --l  
Models that include an imperfect sensor and false targets also are formulated and 
studied.  Analytical results are obtained for the probability of safe mine field transit.  The 
JAVA programming language and Simkit (Buss, 2002) are used extensively throughout 
this thesis to evaluate the probability of safe minefield transit using simulation. 
Particular issues studied with the models include the probability of safe passage 
through the minefield, the conditional expected value of the distance the ship transits through 
the field given it encounters and does not detect a mine, the conditional expected value of the 
distance the ship travels through the field given it passes through the field safely, and the 
expected value of number of path retracing.  These outputs are used to verify the simulation 
results with those of the analytical model in Chapters II, III, V, and VI. 
The analytical model and simulation model are used to provide recommendations 
on conditions when a mine avoidance tactic can usefully be employed to transit a 
minefield.  
                                                 
5 There is no mine in the first evading direction. 
6 There is a mine in the first evading direction. 
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II. SIMPLE MINEFIELD TRANSIT MODEL  
 
A. ANALYTICAL MODEL 
Simplified stochastic models (SMT Model; Simple Minefield Transit Model) are 
presented in this section (Jacobs, 2002). 
1. Mine Only Case 
Consider a rectangular minefield of distance L across. 
 
Figure 6.   Minefield Transit in SMT Model. 
 
Assume the positions of mines in the region can be well summarized by a Poisson 
process with rate Ml .  A ship is to travel from the entry to the field to the top.  The ship 
has an effective width w.  The ship has an imperfect sensor to detect mines.  Assume that 
when a ship encounters a mine, it will detect it with probability Pd(M) independent of the 
other mines.  If the ship encounters a mine without detecting it, the mine will explode and 
possibly damage the ship.  If the ship detects a mine, it retraces its route to the entry to 
the minefield, moves to a different location along the outside of minefield and attempts to 




not intersect any of its previous attempts. The following is a calculation of the probability 
that the ship will successfully cross the field. 
Let N be the number of mines in the initial path across the field.  The effective 
region induced by the initial path is a rectangle with width w and distance L across and 
has area wL.  The number of mines in this region has a Poisson distribution with mean 
*M wLl .  Let S be the event that the ship successfully crosses the field. 
{
prob ship successfullyprob first mine
crosses after it returnsencountered
to the bottom of the fieldis detected
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This is an equation for P(S).  Solving for P(S) 
( )
( )
















Note, if Pd(M)=1, then P(S)=1. 
If Pd(M)=0, then P(S)= { 0} M LwP N e l-= =  
2. Mine, NOMBO, and False Alarm Cases 
Assume that the field contains not only mines but also NOMBOs and the sensor 
can give false alarms.  If the ship detects a NOMBO or the sensor gives a false alarm, the 
ship will retrace its route to the entry to the field and attempt to cross the field again 
along a straight- line path that does not intersect the previous abandoned path(s). Such a 
path will always exist for a minefield with infinite width. Assume detected NOMBOs 
occur according to a Poisson process with rate ( )O dp Ol  and false alarms occur 
according to a Poisson process with rate Fl .  Let N be the number of events requiring 
action, e.g., encountering a mine, detecting a NOMBO or experiencing false alarms that 
occur along the initial path through the field. 
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Do = distance until there is a NOMBO.   




Do(d) = distance until a NOMBO is detected.   
Do(d) has an exponential distribution with mean
1
 
( )O dP Ol
. 
DF = distance until there is a false alarm.   






C = type of event =
   with prob  ,   = Mine                 
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  with prob  ,   = Detected Object
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   with prob  ,   = False Alarm        
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P( S | C = M, N > 0 ) = Pd(M)*P(S) 
P( S | C = Od, N > 0 ) = P(S) 
P( S | C = F, N > 0 ) = P(S) 
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P(S) = P( S | N = 0 )P{N = 0} + 
P( S | N > 0, C = M )P{N > 0, C = M} + 
P( S | N > 0, C = Od )P{N > 0, C = Od } + 
P( S | N > 0, C = F )P{N > 0, C = F} 
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This is an equation for P(S).  Solving for P(S) 
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As a special case, when 0O Fl l= =  
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The result agrees with that for the mine only case. 
B. SIMULATION 
1. Introduction to Simulation 
The simulation discussed below was developed to increase the variety of 
experimentation possibilities with the Analytical Minefield Transit Model.  The 
simulation is written in the JAVA programming language, and is run by typing the 
appropriate input parameters in the command window shown in Figure 7 below.  The 
simulation considers three special cases determined by the input parameters.  The first 
case is a mine only case.  This case is simulated when the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs 
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and the rate of false alarms are zero.  The second special case is a mine and NOMBO 
case.  This is simulated when the rate of false alarms is set equal to zero.  Finally, the 
third case is a mine, NOMBO, and false alarm case.  This is simulated when all three rate 
parameters are positive. 
 
Figure 7.   SMT Model Simulation Input Parameters. 
Figure 7 shows input parameters.  The parameters include the rate of occurrence 
of mines, the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs, and the rate of occurrence of false alarms, 
Y-axis length of the minefield, the mine actuation width of the ship, and the probability 
of the detection of mines and NOMBOs from the sensor onboard the ship. In particular, 
the ROC 7  curve model determines the false alarm rate. This model computes the 
probability of a false alarm (Pf) based on a given probability of detecting a mine or 
NOMBO (Pd) and the rate of occurrence of false alarms is calculated by using the Pf. 
[Appendix A] (Pilnick, 2002). 
 
Figure 8.   SMT Model Simulation Output. 
                                                 
7 ROC: Receiver Operating Characteristic. 
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Figure 8 shows output. The simulation results for probability of success are 
compared with the analytical model results for verification of both formulations.  In 
addition, the simulation enhances the analytical results by providing additional 
information shown such as conditional mean distance traveled given unsuccessful transit; 
the conditional mean distance traveled given transit is successful; the mean distance 
traveled; and the mean number of retracings (returns to the entry to the minefield).  The 
simulation also provides the distribution of the distance traveled in the minefield and 
counts of path retracing. 
2. The Simulation 
Figure 9 below shows pseudo code of a SMT model simulation of a mine only 
case.  The simulation starts with drawing the distance to the first mine (DM) on the track.  
If DM is greater than L, the loop finishes.  Else, according to the probability of detecting 
the mine, the ship will return and enter again at new starting point or be exploded.  To 
obtain output statistics with small standard errors, the simulation is replicated 10,000 
times in each run.  
 
Figure 9.   Pseudo Code of SMT Model Simulation (Mine Only Case). 
 
Distance need is L( Y axis ), Width of mine actuation is w 
Ml  = E[ # mines / unit area ] 
Pd(M) = Probability of detecting mine 
 
Draw distance to first mine is DM 
DM :  exp mean ( )1/ *M wl  
 
Do 
   If DM > L  
      Finish 
   Else 
      Uniform(0, 1) £  Pd(M)     then return , draw new D, and enter again 
      Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(M)     then blow up  
Until (Finish or Blow up) 
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Figures 10 and 11 below display pseudo codes of the other SMT model 
simulations. 
 
Figure 10.   Pseudo Code of SMT Model Simulation (Mine and NOMBO Case). 
 
Distance need is L( Y axis ), Width of mine actuation is w 
Ml  = E[ # mines / unit area] 
Ol  = E[ # of NOMBOs / unit area] 
Pd(M) = Probability of detecting mine 
Pd(O) = Probability of detecting NOMBO 
 
Draw distance to first mine is DM 
Draw distance to first NOMBO is DO 
DM ~ exp mean ( )1/ *M wl  
DO ~ exp mean ( )1/ *O wl  
 
Do 
   If Min(DM, DO) > L  
      Finish 
   Else If DM £  DO 
      Uniform(0, 1) £  Pd(M)    then return , draw new D, and enter again 
      Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(M)    then blow up 
   Else 
      Uniform(0, 1) £  Pd(O)    then return , draw new D, and enter again 
      Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(O)    then draw new DO ( DO = DO  + new DO ) 
         Do 
            If Min(DM, DO) > L  
               Finish 
            Else If DO £   DM 
               Uniform(0, 1) £  Pd(O)    then return , draw new D, and enter again 
            Else If DM £   DO 
               Uniform(0, 1) £  Pd(M)    then return , draw new D, and enter again 
               Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(M)    then blow up 
         Until (Finish, Return or Blow up) 




Figure 11.   Pseudo Code of SMT Model Simulation (Mine, NOMBO Case, and False 
Alarm Case). 
Distance need is L( Y axis ), Width of mine actuation is w 
Ml  = E[ # mines / unit area] 
Ol  = E[ # of NOMBOs / unit area] 
Fl  = E[ # false Alarms / unit area] 
 
Pd(M) = Probability of detecting mine 
Pd(O) = Probability of detecting NOMBO 
 
Draw distance to first mine is DM 
Draw distance to first NOMBO is DO 
Draw distance to first false alarm is DF 
 
DM ~ exp mean ( )1/ *M wl  
DO ~ exp mean ( )1/ *O wl  
DF ~ exp mean ( )1/ *F wl  
 
Do 
If Min(DM, DO, DF) > L 
Finish 
Else If DM £   Min(DO, DF) 
Uniform(0, 1) £  Pd(M)    then return , draw new D, and enter again 
Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(M)    then blow up 
Else If DF £   Min(DM, DO) 
then return , draw new D, and enter again 
Else If DO £   Min(DM, DF) 
Uniform(0, 1) £  Pd(O)    then return , draw new D, and enter again 
Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(O)     then draw new DO ( DO = DO  + new DO ) 
Do 
If Min(DM, DO, DF) > L 
Finish 
Else If DO £   Min(DM, DF) 
Uniform(0, 1) £  Pd(O)    then return , draw new D, and enter again 
Else If DM £   Min(DO, DF) 
Uniform(0, 1) £  Pd(M)    then return , draw new D, and enter again 
Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(M)     then blow up 
Else If DF £   Min(DM, DO) 
then return , draw new D, and enter again 
Until (Finish, Return or Blow up) 
Until (Finish or Blow up) 
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III. INITIAL ANALYSIS OF THE SIMULATION FOR THE 
SIMPLE MINEFIELD TRANSIT MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares the simulation results with a numerical example using the 
analytical SMT model.  The fraction of replications resulting in successful minefield 
transit is compared to the analytical probability of safe minefield transit.  This is 
computed for the mine-only case, mine + NOMBO case, and mine + NOMBO + false 
alarm case respectively. The probabilities of a false alarm used in the models appear in 
Table 48 in Appendix A. All simulation runs have 10,000 replications. 
B. PROBABILITY OF SAFE MINEFIELD TRANSIT 
The tables below show the output of the analytical SMT model. 
lambdaM 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
distance 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
width 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pd(M) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
x 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 
P(S) 0.165 0.180 0.198 0.221 0.248 0.284 0.331 0.398 0.498 0.664 1.000 
P(F) 0.835 0.820 0.802 0.779 0.752 0.716 0.669 0.602 0.502 0.336 0.000 
x=exp(-lambdaM*L*w)          
Table 1. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Mine Only Case). 
 
lambdaM 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
lambdaO 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
distance 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
width 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pd(M) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Pd(O) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
x 0.165 0.138 0.115 0.096 0.080 0.067 0.056 0.047 0.039 0.033 0.027 
P(S) 0.165 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.170 0.178 0.192 0.218 0.268 0.391 1.000 
P(F) 0.835 0.836 0.836 0.835 0.830 0.822 0.808 0.782 0.732 0.609 0.000 
x=exp(-(lambdaM+lambdaO*Pd(O))*L*w)      
Table 2. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Mine and NOMBO Case). 
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Table 3. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Mine, NOMBO, and False Alarm Case). 
 
lambdaM 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
distance 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
width 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pd(M) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
P(S) 0.165 0.198 0.237 0.284 0.340 0.407 0.487 0.583 0.698 0.835 1.000 
P(S)=exp(-lambdaM*L*w(1-Pd(M)))       
Table 4. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Optimistic Case). 
 
The rate of occurrence of mines and NOMBOs used in this analysis is 0.3 
mines/mile2.  The minefield distance is 6 miles and the width of the mine actuation is 1 
mile.  As mentioned previously, the ROC curve model determines the rate of false alarm 
in Table 3 [Appendix A].  The probabilities of mine detection and NOMBO detection are 
assumed equal, i.e., Pd(M) = Pd(O) = Pd, because, when the ship detects some object in 
the water, the ship evades the object without classification. 
To compare these outputs, an optimistic case is calculated.  The optimistic case 
uses all the assumptions of the analytical model with the exception that, when the ship 
detects a mine, it will proceed towards the end of the field without diversion and without 
exploding the mine.   
To obtain an upper bound on the probability of safe minefield transit, let  
lambdaM 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
lambdaO 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
lambdaF 0 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.017 0.029 0.043 0.062 0.091 0.152 1.101 
distance 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
width 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pd(M) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Pd(O) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
x 0.165 0.137 0.112 0.090 0.073 0.057 0.043 0.032 0.023 0.013 0.000 
P(S) 0.165 0.163 0.161 0.159 0.160 0.161 0.165 0.175 0.196 0.243 1.000 
P(F) 0.835 0.837 0.839 0.841 0.840 0.839 0.835 0.825 0.804 0.757 0.000 
x=exp(-(lambdaM+lambdaO*Pd(O)+lambdaF)*L*w)      
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Nu = number of mines undetected in path L *w. Nu has a Poisson distribution with mean 
( ) ( )( )* 1M dL w P Ml - . 
An upper bound on the probability of a safe minefield transit is: 
( )(1 ( ))( ) ( 0) M dLw P MuP S P N e
l- -= = =                                                        (2) 
In any case, the probabilities of safe minefield transit will not exceed the 
optimistic case.  Table 4 above shows the upper bounds on the probabilities of a safe 
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Figure 12.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Analytical Model). 
 
Figure 12 shows four cases of the probability of a safe minefield transit.  As can 
be seen in the above graph, the probability of a safe minefield transit decreases when 
NOMBOs exist in the minefield and false alarms occur, and increases when the 
probability of detection increases. 
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Table 5 below shows the estimates of the probabilities that the ship transits the 
minefield safely for the simulation.  Input parameters of simulation are the same as those 
of the analytical model.  The number of simulation replications is 10,000 for each case.  
The confidence limits are obtained using a normal approximation. (Devore, 2000) 
 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
+.95 
CI 
0.172 0.188 0.203 0.224 0.251 0.291 0.339 0.404 0.506 0.677 1.000 
- .95 
CI 0.157 0.173 0.188 0.208 0.234 0.273 0.320 0.385 0.487 0.659 1.000 




Err 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 
Analytical Mean 0.165 0.180 0.198 0.221 0.248 0.284 0.331 0.398 0.498 0.664 1.000 
+.95 
CI 
0.172 0.166 0.167 0.170 0.178 0.183 0.201 0.224 0.282 0.404 1.000 
- .95 
CI 0.157 0.151 0.152 0.156 0.164 0.168 0.185 0.208 0.265 0.385 1.000 




Err 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.000 
Analytical Mean 0.165 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.170 0.178 0.192 0.218 0.268 0.391 1.000 
+.95 
CI 
0.172 0.166 0.165 0.161 0.163 0.165 0.170 0.187 0.206 0.257 1.000 
- .95 
CI 0.157 0.151 0.151 0.147 0.148 0.151 0.155 0.172 0.190 0.240 1.000 







0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.000 
Analytical Mean 0.165 0.163 0.161 0.159 0.160 0.161 0.165 0.175 0.196 0.243 1.000 
 
Table 5. Estimate of Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Simulation). 
 
Figure 13 below shows the mean probability of a safe minefield transit and 95% 
CI graphically.  For all cases, the analytical probabilities are within the 95% confidence 
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Figure 13.   Estimate of Probability of Safe Minefield Transit and 95% CI. 
 
C. OTHER SIMULATION RESULTS 
1. Conditional Mean Distance Traveled Given Unsuccessful Transit 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.999 
+.95 
CI 2.1995 2.6371 3.1249 3.6646 4.4201 5.4613 6.7591 8.4912 11.357 16.011 35.668 
- .95 
CI 2.1304 2.5333 2.9895 3.4982 4.2112 5.1931 6.4118 8.0368 10.694 14.888 22.271 




Err 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0011 0.0015 0.0024 0.0050 0.461 
+.95 
CI 2.1995 2.9438 3.7403 4.7786 6.1102 7.8561 10.396 14.288 21.002 36.625 105.16 
- .95 
CI 2.1304 2.8187 3.5707 4.5538 5.8232 7.4812 9.916 13.635 19.999 34.764 78.92 




Err 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0011 0.0014 0.0019 0.0030 0.0061 0.500 
+.95 
CI 2.1995 2.9991 3.8363 4.9053 6.3854 8.2653 10.928 15.312 24.466 48.004 2125.7 
- .95 
CI 2.1304 2.8709 3.6619 4.6790 6.0884 7.8818 10.430 14.627 23.364 45.834 1983.0 






Err 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0011 0.0014 0.0019 0.0031 0.0064 0.656 
             































Figure 14.   Conditional Mean Distance Traveled Given Unsuccessful Transit and 95% CI. 
 
Table 6 and Figure 14 above show the conditional mean distance traveled given 
an unsuccessful minefield transit as the probability of detection increases.  In this case, 
the results do not exist when the probability of detection is 1.0.  Therefore, the probability 
of detection 0.999 is used instead of 1.0 to obtain the extreme results.  The conditional 
mean distance traveled given unsuccessful minefield transit increases as the probability 
of detection increases and it increases quickly when NOMBOs and false alarms exist. 
Figures 15 and 16 display histograms of the distance traveled given unsuccessful 
transit, when there exist mines and NOMBOs in the field and there are no false alarms. 
Two cases (low and high rates of occurrence of NOMBOs in the minefield) are compared 
to study how the NOMBO acts on the minefield travel distance given unsuccessful transit.  
All the assumptions are same as those used earlier in this chapter except that the width of 
mine actuation is 0.5 miles. The low (respectively high) rate of occurrence of the 












































Figure 15.   Histogram of Distance Traveled Given Unsuccessful Transit, L=6, w=0.5, 











































Figure 16.   Histogram of Distance Traveled Given Unsuccessful Transit, L=6, w=0.5, 
Ml =0.3, Ol =1.5, Fl =0.0, Pd=0.7. 
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The total number of observations displayed in Figure 15 is 3870 and that of 
Figure 16 is 7913.  The mean and maximum distances traveled displayed in Figure 15 are 
10.51 miles and 102.56 miles, and in Figure 16 are 32.15 miles and 300.97 miles 
respectively.  This shows us that, when the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs increases in 
the minefield, the mean and maximum distances traveled before encountering an 
undetected mine also increase.  
2. Conditional Mean Distance Traveled Given Successful Transit 
Table 7 and Figure 17 below show the conditional mean distance traveled given a 
successful transit, as the probability of detection increases.  The mean distance traveled 
given a successful transit increases as the probability of detection increases.  According 
to the ROC curve model, when the probability of detecting mine (Pd(M)) is 1, the 
probability of a false alarm (Pf) is almost 1.  As a result, the rate of a false alarm (lF) 
becomes 1.101, which makes the total distance extremely long. 
 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
+.95 
CI 6.0000 6.5186 6.9953 7.5699 8.3665 9.2197 10.512 12.260 14.963 19.670 28.452 
- .95 
CI 
6.0000 6.3494 6.7609 7.2813 8.0186 8.8310 10.036 11.711 14.308 18.884 27.465 





0.0000 0.0010 0.0014 0.0016 0.0018 0.0019 0.0021 0.0022 0.0024 0.0025 0.0025 
+.95 
CI 6.0000 6.9054 7.8685 9.0282 10.478 12.522 14.876 18.765 25.818 41.059 115.70 
- .95 
CI 6.0000 6.6714 7.5050 8.5388 9.848 11.693 13.907 17.536 24.179 38.707 111.25 




Err 0.0000 0.0015 0.0023 0.0031 0.0039 0.0050 0.0056 0.0067 0.0080 0.0096 0.0113 
+.95 
CI 
6.0000 6.8358 7.9987 9.2143 10.385 13.124 16.087 20.364 30.127 53.176 32488 
- .95 
CI 6.0000 6.6162 7.6071 8.6904 9.743 12.246 14.918 18.811 27.855 49.420 31240 






Err 0.0000 0.0014 0.0025 0.0034 0.0042 0.0056 0.0074 0.0093 0.0131 0.0192 3.1828 
             































Figure 17.   Conditional Mean Distance Traveled Given Successful Transit and 95% CI. 
 
Figures 18 and 19 below display histograms of the distance traveled given 
successful transit, when there exist mines and NOMBOs in the field and there are no false 
alarms, and the distance traveled is greater than the distance of the minefield.  Two cases 
(low and high rates of occurrence of NOMBOs in the minefield) are compared to study 
how the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs influences the minefield travel distance given 
successful transit. The low (respectively high) rate of occurrence of the NOMBOs is 0.3 
(respectively 1.5). 
When Ol = 0.3, the fraction of replications that the distance traveled given 
successful transit equals to the distance of the minefield is 2,095/6,130 = 0.3418; when 
Ol = 1.5, the fraction of replications in which the distance equals to the distance of the 
minefield is 170/2,087 = 0.0815.  So, for the purpose of analysis, the replications that the 
distance traveled given successful transit equals to the distance of the minefield are 
truncated from the original data.  The total number of observations displayed in Figure 18 
is 4035 and in Figure 19 is 1917. The mean and maximum distances traveled as displayed 
in Figure 18 are 18.41 miles and 112.30 miles, and in Figure 19 are 38.92 miles and 
28 
207.09 miles respectively. This shows us that, when the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs 
increases in the minefield, the mean and maximum distances traveled also increase.  The 
conditional distribution of the distances traveled is very long tailed. This suggests that 

















Figure 18.   Histogram of Distance Traveled Given Successful Transit, L=6, w=0.5, 

















Figure 19.   Histogram of Distance Traveled Given Successful Transit, L=6, w=0.5, 
Ml =0.3, Ol =1.5, Fl =0.0, Pd=0.7. 
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3. Mean Distance Traveled 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
+.95 
CI 
2.8363 3.3348 3.8707 4.4893 5.3512 6.4852 7.9455 9.9117 13.053 18.330 28.451 
- .95 
CI 2.7561 3.2274 3.7384 4.3319 5.1604 6.2542 7.6568 9.5543 12.582 17.682 27.465 




Err 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0012 0.0017 0.0025 
+.95 
CI 2.8363 3.5634 4.3807 5.4442 6.8184 8.6212 11.190 15.157 22.159 38.075 115.70 
- .95 
CI 
2.7561 3.4385 4.2163 5.2313 6.5501 8.2732 10.755 14.576 21.300 36.614 111.25 






0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 0.0015 0.0022 0.0037 0.0113 
+.95 
CI 2.8363 3.5979 4.4727 5.5420 6.9697 8.9800 11.695 16.115 25.416 48.946 32488 
- .95 
CI 2.7561 3.4723 4.3032 5.3261 6.6943 8.6225 11.231 15.484 24.421 47.065 31240 







Err 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0012 0.0016 0.0025 0.0048 3.18 
             






























Figure 20.   Mean Distance Traveled and 95% CI. 
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Table 8 and Figure 20 above show the mean distance traveled. This mean distance 
traveled contains not only the distance traveled given successful transit but also the 
distance traveled given unsuccessful transit. 
4. Mean Number of Retracings 
Table 9 and Figure 21 below show the mean number of retracings (returns to the 
entry to the minefield) according to the probability of detection.  The mean number of 
retracings increases as the probability of detection increases.  The shape of Figure 21 is 
similar to that of Figure 20, indicating a close relation between the distance traveled and 
the number of retracings (returns to the entry to the minefield). 
 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
+.95 
CI 0.0000 0.1015 0.2149 0.3443 0.5218 0.7495 1.0502 1.4506 2.0940 3.1676 5.2185 
- .95 
CI 0.0000 0.0889 0.1955 0.3183 0.4876 0.7055 0.9926 1.3782 1.9950 3.0274 4.9979 





0.0000 0.0032 0.0049 0.0066 0.0087 0.0112 0.0147 0.0185 0.0253 0.0358 0.0563 
+.95 
CI 0.0000 0.1965 0.4365 0.7351 1.1400 1.6838 2.4973 3.7615 6.0080 11.192 36.566 
- .95 
CI 0.0000 0.1779 0.4061 0.6911 1.0796 1.6000 2.3839 3.6013 5.7566 10.735 35.098 





Err 0.0000 0.0047 0.0077 0.0112 0.0154 0.0214 0.0289 0.0409 0.0641 0.1165 0.3746 
+.95 
CI 
0.0000 0.2056 0.4628 0.7816 1.2366 1.9051 2.8433 4.4486 7.9655 17.772 27640 
- .95 
CI 0.0000 0.1868 0.4312 0.7364 1.1724 1.8141 2.7161 4.2598 7.6383 17.068 26578 






Err 0.0000 0.0048 0.0081 0.0115 0.0164 0.0232 0.0324 0.0482 0.0834 0.1796 270.81 
             



































Figure 21.   Mean Number of Retracings in the Minefield and 95% CI. 
 
D. DISCUSSION 
Using the probability of a safe minefield transit in various environments 
according to the probability of mine or NOMBO detection as the MOE8, the simulation 
output compares well to the analytical SMT model.  The analytical calculation results are 
within the 95% confidence intervals obtained from the simulation outputs with the same 
input.  This suggests the simulation is consistent with the analytical SMT model for these 
parameters. 
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IV. EFFECT OF THE NOMBO AND FALSE ALARM ON THE 
SAFE MINEFIELD TRANSIT IN THE SIMPLE MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the effects of the NOMBOs and false alarms on the 
probability of safe minefield transit in a SMT model.  This is accomplished by varying 
the rate of the occurrence of NOMBOs ( )Ol  and detection index (d)9 respectively and is 
compared with a no sensor case when a ship transits the minefield along a direct, straight 
line without a sensor.  If a probability of safe minefield transit (P(S)), when using a 
sensor, is less than or equal to that with no sensor case, there is no benefit to the ship 
using a sensor to transit the minefield.  The rate of occurrence of NOMBOs ranges from 
0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1.  The detection index ranges from 0 to 10.0.  On the intervals 
0 to 1.0, the increments are 0.2.  On the intervals 2.0 to 10.0, the increments are 2. The 
probabilities of a false alarm used in the models appear in Table 48 in Appendix A. The 
MOE under investigation is the probability of a safe minefield transit, and if and how the 
change of rate of the occurrence of NOMBOs ( )Ol  or detection index (d) affects this 
probability. The analytical model in equation (1) is used to obtain the results in this 
section.  However, the results could also have been obtained using the simulation. 
B. INPUT PARAMETERS 










( )Ml  
Rate of 
NOMBO 




Mine Only 6 .5 0.1 :  1.0 0 - 
Mine & NOMBO 6 .5 0.2, 0.6, 1.0 0.0 :  1.0 - 
Mine & False Alarm 6 .5 0.2, 0.6, 1.0 0 0.0 :  10.0 
Mine, NOMBO & 
False Alarm 
6 .5 0.2, 0.6, 1.0 .6 0.0 :  10.0 
Table 10. Input Parameters for Each Environment. 
                                                 
9 Detection Index affects a rate of false alarm. 
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C. OUTPUTS 
1. Mine Only Case 
Probability of Detection lambdaM 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.1 0.741 0.761 0.781 0.803 0.827 0.851 0.877 0.905 0.935 0.966 1.000 
0.2 0.549 0.575 0.603 0.635 0.670 0.709 0.753 0.802 0.859 0.924 1.000 
0.3 0.407 0.432 0.461 0.495 0.533 0.578 0.631 0.695 0.774 0.873 1.000 
0.4 0.301 0.324 0.350 0.381 0.418 0.463 0.519 0.590 0.683 0.812 1.000 
0.5 0.223 0.242 0.264 0.291 0.324 0.365 0.418 0.489 0.590 0.742 1.000 
0.6 0.165 0.180 0.198 0.221 0.248 0.284 0.331 0.398 0.498 0.664 1.000 
0.7 0.122 0.134 0.149 0.166 0.189 0.218 0.259 0.317 0.411 0.583 1.000 
0.8 0.091 0.100 0.111 0.125 0.143 0.166 0.200 0.250 0.333 0.499 1.000 
0.9 0.067 0.074 0.083 0.093 0.107 0.126 0.153 0.194 0.265 0.419 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.070 0.080 0.095 0.116 0.149 0.208 0.344 1.000 
            




























Figure 22.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ol =0.0. 
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Table 11 and Figure 22 above are generated from the results of the analytical 
models. The probabilities of a safe minefield transit are plotted.  Table 11 shows the 
probabilities of successful minefield transit for various Ml . When the probability of 
detection increases and the rate of occurrence of deployed mines decreases, the 
probability of safe minefield transit increases.  In addition, there is no probability of a 
safe minefield transit with a sensor that is less than that of a no sensor case, which means 
that, whenever a ship uses a sensor, the probability of safe minefield transit never 
decreases.  Thus, it is beneficial to the ship to use a sensor, even when the probability of 
detection of the sensor is low, while transiting the minefield in this case in which there 
are no NOMBOs and no false alarms. 
2. Mine and NOMBO Case 
The tables below show the probability of safe minefield transit, when the rate of 
occurrence of mines is 0.2, 0.6, and 1.0, respectively.  The rate of occurrence of 
NOMBOs ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1. There are no false alarms. The 
effect of the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs on the probability of a safe minefield transit 
is shown as the rate of the occurrence of mines in the field increases. The case with 
probability of detection equal to 0 is that a ship does not use a sensor and transits the 
minefield in a straight line. 
Probability of Detection lambdaO 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.549 0.575 0.603 0.635 0.670 0.709 0.753 0.802 0.859 0.924 1.000 
0.1 0.549 0.571 0.595 0.623 0.655 0.691 0.733 0.783 0.842 0.913 1.000 
0.2 0.549 0.567 0.587 0.611 0.639 0.673 0.713 0.762 0.822 0.899 1.000 
0.3 0.549 0.563 0.579 0.599 0.623 0.653 0.691 0.738 0.800 0.884 1.000 
0.4 0.549 0.558 0.571 0.586 0.607 0.633 0.667 0.713 0.776 0.865 1.000 
0.5 0.549 0.554 0.562 0.574 0.590 0.612 0.642 0.685 0.748 0.844 1.000 
0.6 0.549 0.550 0.554 0.561 0.572 0.590 0.616 0.656 0.718 0.818 1.000 
0.7 0.549 0.546 0.545 0.547 0.554 0.567 0.588 0.624 0.684 0.790 1.000 
0.8 0.549 0.542 0.536 0.534 0.535 0.543 0.560 0.591 0.648 0.757 1.000 
0.9 0.549 0.537 0.528 0.520 0.517 0.519 0.530 0.556 0.608 0.719 1.000 
1.0 0.549 0.533 0.519 0.506 0.498 0.494 0.499 0.519 0.567 0.678 1.000 
Table 12. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ml =0.2. 
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Probability of Detection lambdaO 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.165 0.180 0.198 0.221 0.248 0.284 0.331 0.398 0.498 0.664 1.000 
0.1 0.165 0.178 0.192 0.211 0.234 0.264 0.306 0.365 0.459 0.624 1.000 
0.2 0.165 0.175 0.186 0.201 0.220 0.246 0.281 0.334 0.419 0.581 1.000 
0.3 0.165 0.172 0.180 0.192 0.207 0.228 0.257 0.303 0.380 0.535 1.000 
0.4 0.165 0.169 0.175 0.183 0.194 0.210 0.234 0.273 0.341 0.488 1.000 
0.5 0.165 0.166 0.169 0.174 0.181 0.194 0.213 0.245 0.304 0.439 1.000 
0.6 0.165 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.170 0.178 0.192 0.218 0.268 0.391 1.000 
0.7 0.165 0.161 0.158 0.157 0.158 0.163 0.173 0.193 0.235 0.344 1.000 
0.8 0.165 0.158 0.153 0.149 0.147 0.149 0.155 0.170 0.204 0.299 1.000 
0.9 0.165 0.156 0.148 0.141 0.137 0.135 0.138 0.149 0.176 0.258 1.000 
1.0 0.165 0.153 0.143 0.134 0.127 0.123 0.123 0.130 0.151 0.219 1.000 
            
Table 13. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ml =0.6. 
 
Probability of Detection lambdaO 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.070 0.080 0.095 0.116 0.149 0.208 0.344 1.000 
0.1 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.066 0.074 0.086 0.103 0.130 0.180 0.301 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.068 0.078 0.092 0.114 0.156 0.261 1.000 
0.3 0.050 0.052 0.054 0.058 0.063 0.070 0.081 0.099 0.133 0.223 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.054 0.058 0.063 0.071 0.086 0.114 0.190 1.000 
0.5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.053 0.057 0.063 0.074 0.096 0.159 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.063 0.081 0.133 1.000 
0.7 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.054 0.068 0.110 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.047 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.057 0.090 1.000 
0.9 0.050 0.046 0.042 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.040 0.047 0.074 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.045 0.040 0.037 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.039 0.060 1.000 
            
Table 14. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ml =1.0. 
The colored boxes in the above tables indicate that the probability of a safe 















































































Figure 25.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ml =1.0. 
 
All the values located below the dotted line in the above graphs are the 
probabilities of a safe minefield transit which are less than or equal to that of the no 
sensor case. The tables and graphs clearly indicate a pattern.  The plots of the data above 
show that a relation exists between the probability of a safe minefield transit and the rate 
of occurrence of NOMBOs in the minefield. In addition, it is possible to determine that, 
as the rate of occurrence of mines increases, the region in which the probability of a safe 
minefield transit when using a sensor falls below that of the no sensor case also increases. 
3. Mine and False Alarm Case 
The tables below show the probabilities of a safe minefield transit, when the rate 
of occurrence of NOMBOs is 0.0 and the rate of occurrence of mines is  0.2, 0.6, and 1.0, 
respectively. In addition, the rate of occurrence of false alarms is a function of the 
probability of detection and the detection index as discussed in the appendix A. The 
detection index ranges from 0.0 to 10.0.  This shows the effect of a false alarm on the 
39 
probability of a safe minefield transit according to the rate of occurrence of mines in the 
field. 
Table 15. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ol =0.0, Ml =0.2. 
 
Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.165 0.171 0.177 0.184 0.194 0.200 0.211 0.228 0.253 0.286 1.000 
0.2 0.165 0.176 0.188 0.202 0.218 0.234 0.257 0.288 0.333 0.403 1.000 
0.4 0.165 0.178 0.191 0.207 0.224 0.246 0.273 0.310 0.356 0.449 1.000 
0.6 0.165 0.179 0.193 0.209 0.229 0.253 0.283 0.325 0.378 0.470 1.000 
0.8 0.165 0.179 0.194 0.212 0.232 0.258 0.290 0.333 0.397 0.500 1.000 
1.0 0.165 0.179 0.195 0.214 0.236 0.261 0.295 0.341 0.408 0.517 1.000 
2.0 0.165 0.180 0.197 0.218 0.243 0.274 0.314 0.366 0.445 0.574 1.000 
4.0 0.165 0.180 0.198 0.220 0.247 0.281 0.325 0.387 0.478 0.626 1.000 
6.0 0.165 0.180 0.198 0.220 0.248 0.283 0.329 0.394 0.489 0.647 1.000 
8.0 0.165 0.180 0.198 0.221 0.248 0.283 0.330 0.396 0.494 0.655 1.000 
10.0 0.165 0.180 0.198 0.221 0.248 0.284 0.331 0.397 0.496 0.660 1.000 
            
Table 16. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ol =0.0, Ml =0.6. 
Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.549 0.561 0.573 0.589 0.607 0.620 0.640 0.668 0.702 0.745 1.000 
0.2 0.549 0.569 0.590 0.612 0.637 0.661 0.690 0.726 0.770 0.825 1.000 
0.4 0.549 0.571 0.594 0.619 0.644 0.673 0.705 0.744 0.786 0.848 1.000 
0.6 0.549 0.572 0.597 0.622 0.650 0.680 0.715 0.755 0.799 0.858 1.000 
0.8 0.549 0.573 0.598 0.625 0.653 0.685 0.720 0.761 0.810 0.870 1.000 
1.0 0.549 0.573 0.599 0.627 0.657 0.688 0.725 0.767 0.817 0.877 1.000 
2.0 0.549 0.574 0.602 0.631 0.664 0.700 0.740 0.784 0.835 0.897 1.000 
4.0 0.549 0.575 0.603 0.634 0.668 0.706 0.748 0.796 0.850 0.913 1.000 
6.0 0.549 0.575 0.603 0.635 0.669 0.708 0.751 0.800 0.855 0.919 1.000 
8.0 0.549 0.575 0.603 0.635 0.670 0.708 0.752 0.801 0.857 0.922 1.000 
10.0 0.549 0.575 0.603 0.635 0.670 0.709 0.752 0.802 0.858 0.923 1.000 
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Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.051 0.053 0.055 0.058 0.059 0.062 0.068 0.075 0.085 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.054 0.057 0.062 0.068 0.073 0.081 0.092 0.110 0.139 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.064 0.070 0.078 0.088 0.102 0.121 0.165 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.065 0.072 0.081 0.093 0.109 0.132 0.178 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.054 0.060 0.066 0.073 0.083 0.095 0.114 0.143 0.198 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.055 0.060 0.067 0.075 0.085 0.098 0.118 0.149 0.210 1.000 
2.0 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.068 0.078 0.090 0.107 0.131 0.172 0.255 1.000 
4.0 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.069 0.080 0.093 0.113 0.142 0.193 0.303 1.000 
6.0 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.070 0.080 0.094 0.115 0.146 0.202 0.324 1.000 
8.0 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.070 0.080 0.095 0.115 0.148 0.205 0.334 1.000 
10.0 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.070 0.080 0.095 0.116 0.148 0.206 0.339 1.000 
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Figure 28.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ol =0.0, Ml =1.0. 
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The tables and graphs clearly show the effect of false alarms on the probability of 
a safe minefield transit. As the detection index increases and the rate of occurrence of 
false alarms decreases, the probability of safe minefield transit increases. For a fixed 
probability of detection, the probability of a safe minefield transit is essentially constant 
for detection indices greater than 4. The probability of a safe minefield transit with a 
sensor is always greater than the probability of a safe minefield transit in a no sensor case. 
4. Mine, NOMBO, and False Alarm Case 
The tables below show the probabilities of a safe minefield transit when the rate 
of the occurrence of NOMBOs is 0.6 and the rate of occurrence of mines is 0.2, 0.6, and 
1.0 respectively, and the rate of occurrence of false alarms is a function of the probability 
of detection and the detection index as described in Appendix A. These results shows the 
effect of NOMBOs and false alarms on the probability of a safe minefield transit as a 
function of the rate of occurrence of mines in the field.  
Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.549 0.536 0.522 0.509 0.497 0.479 0.466 0.460 0.459 0.464 1.000 
0.2 0.549 0.544 0.539 0.535 0.533 0.528 0.529 0.538 0.558 0.597 1.000 
0.4 0.549 0.546 0.544 0.543 0.541 0.543 0.549 0.564 0.584 0.643 1.000 
0.6 0.549 0.548 0.546 0.546 0.548 0.553 0.562 0.581 0.606 0.662 1.000 
0.8 0.549 0.548 0.548 0.549 0.552 0.558 0.570 0.590 0.626 0.689 1.000 
1.0 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.551 0.557 0.563 0.576 0.599 0.637 0.704 1.000 
2.0 0.549 0.550 0.552 0.557 0.565 0.578 0.597 0.625 0.672 0.751 1.000 
4.0 0.549 0.550 0.553 0.560 0.570 0.586 0.610 0.646 0.701 0.791 1.000 
6.0 0.549 0.550 0.554 0.560 0.572 0.588 0.614 0.652 0.711 0.806 1.000 
8.0 0.549 0.550 0.554 0.561 0.572 0.589 0.615 0.654 0.714 0.812 1.000 
10.0 0.549 0.550 0.554 0.561 0.572 0.590 0.616 0.655 0.716 0.816 1.000 
            
Table 18. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ol =0.6, Ml =0.2. 
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Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.165 0.155 0.144 0.135 0.127 0.116 0.108 0.103 0.100 0.098 1.000 
0.2 0.165 0.160 0.154 0.150 0.146 0.140 0.138 0.139 0.146 0.162 1.000 
0.4 0.165 0.161 0.157 0.154 0.151 0.149 0.149 0.154 0.160 0.192 1.000 
0.6 0.165 0.162 0.159 0.156 0.155 0.154 0.157 0.164 0.175 0.207 1.000 
0.8 0.165 0.162 0.160 0.158 0.157 0.158 0.161 0.170 0.188 0.228 1.000 
1.0 0.165 0.163 0.161 0.159 0.160 0.161 0.165 0.175 0.196 0.243 1.000 
2.0 0.165 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.165 0.170 0.179 0.194 0.224 0.293 1.000 
4.0 0.165 0.164 0.163 0.165 0.169 0.175 0.188 0.210 0.251 0.346 1.000 
6.0 0.165 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.169 0.177 0.191 0.215 0.261 0.370 1.000 
8.0 0.165 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.170 0.178 0.192 0.217 0.265 0.380 1.000 
10.0 0.165 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.170 0.178 0.192 0.218 0.267 0.386 1.000 
            
Table 19. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ol =0.6, Ml =0.6. 
 
Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.045 0.041 0.037 0.034 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.023 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.047 0.045 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.041 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.051 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.047 0.056 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.046 0.051 0.063 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.048 0.047 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.054 0.068 1.000 
2.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.051 0.055 0.064 0.088 1.000 
4.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.054 0.060 0.074 0.111 1.000 
6.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.062 0.078 0.122 1.000 
8.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.063 0.080 0.127 1.000 
10.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.063 0.081 0.130 1.000 
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Figure 31.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ol =0.6, Ml =1.0. 
 
The colored boxes in the above tables and all the values located below the dotted 
line in the above graphs indicate that the probability of a safe minefield transit with a 
sensor is less than or equal to that with no sensor.  The tables above show that, as the 
detection index increases, the range of sensor detection probabilities for which using a 
sensor results in a smaller probability of a safe minefield transit through the field than 
that for a no sensor case becomes smaller.  
D. DISCUSSION 
Comparing the four cases, it appears that the probability of a safe minefield transit 
is highly dependent on the rate of occurrence of mines ( )Ml  in the minefield.  The case 
that the probability of a safe minefield transit with using a sensor is below that with using 
no sensor happens when NOMBOs exist in the field. The results also show that, for a 
fixed probability of detection, the probability of a safe minefield transit is essentially 
constant for detection indices greater than 4. 
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In this study, the step of the classification of an object that is detected is not 
considered. Thus, when the ship detects something in the minefield, it just returns to the 
entry to the field without classification. However, the results of the mine only case and 
the mine + false alarm case can be used to study the advantage of having perfect 
classification capability for mines and NOMBOs. When the ship has a sensor that 
classifies objects perfectly, even though NOMBOs exist in the minefield, the ship can 
classify those correctly and continue to proceed as if they were not there. Thus, the 
results for perfect classification are the same as those of the mine only case and the mine 
+ false alarm case. For instance, in Figure 12, when the probability of detection is 0.7, the 
probability of safe minefield transit of mine only case is 0.398, where as that of mine and 
NOMBO case is 0.218. Here, the mine only case can be considered as a perfect 
classification case, and the mine and NOMBO case can be considered as a no 
classification case. As you see from the results, when the ship has a perfect classification 
sensor, the probability of safe minefield is higher than that with no classification sensor; 
perfect classification results in an approximate 78% increase in the probability of safe 
transit over having no capability for classification. It is also noted that increasing the 
probability of detection from 0.7 to 0.9 in this mine and NOMBO case results in a 
probability of safe passage of 0.391, which is roughly equivalent to the improvement 
possible by adding perfect classification capability. In this manner, the model can be used 
to quantify the benefits of alternative investments in either technology that would 
increase the probability of detection or technology that adds significant classification 
capability. These quantified benefits could then be used in a complete cost-benefit 
analysis. 
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V. MINEFIELD OBJECT AVOIDANCE MANEUVER MODEL  
A. ANALYTICAL MODEL 
Minefield Object Avoidance Maneuver (MOAM) stochastic models are presented 
in this section (Jacobs, 2002).  The avoidance tactic of the MOAM model is somewhat 
more complicated than that of the SMT model. The ship is attempting to cross a 
minefield of distance L across. 
 
 
Figure 32.   Minefield Transit in MOAM Model. 
 
When the ship encounters a detected mine or NOMBO, or a sensor gives a false 
alarm, the ship attempts to go around these.  The ship goes a distance h  to the right (for 
illustration, could alternatively go to the left).  If the ship does not detect a mine or 
NOMBO, or the sensor does not give a false alarm and survives the distance, then it once 
again proceeds to the end of the field.  If the ship encounters a detected object or mine 
while going to the right, it backtracks and tries a distance h  to the left.  If it does not 
detect an object and survives during this avoidance path, it once again proceeds to the end 
of the field.  If the ship encounters a detected mine or NOMBO in both directions and 









,  ,  M O Fl l l  are the rate of occurrence of mines, rate of occurrence of NOMBOs 
and rate of occurrence of false alarms per unit area respectively. 
The probability that the ship finds nothing in (0, h ) is 
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Let ( )hg  be the probability that the ship of effective width w survives a diversion 
around a detected mine or NOMBO, but must go back to the entry to the minefield. 
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Let ( )hb  be the probability that the ship of effective width w survives a diversion 
around a detected mine or NOMBO and can continue towards the end of the minefield 
without returning to the entry to the minefield. 
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Let f  be the probability that an encountered object is not an undetected mine. 
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Let P(S) be the probability of a successful transit of the minefield. 
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As a special case, when Pd = 0 
( ) M wLP S e l-=  
This is the probability that the ship survives transit when it does not use a sensor. 
B. SIMULATION 
The basic function of a MOAM model simulation is similar to the SMT model 
simulation. A MOAM model simulation has the same input parameters and provides the 
same kinds of outputs. The simulation results for probability of success are compared 
with the analytical model results for verification of both formulations.  In addition, the 
simulation enhances the analytical results by providing additional information shown 
such as conditional mean distance traveled given unsuccessful transit; the conditional 
mean distance traveled given transit is successful; the mean distance traveled; and the 
mean number of retracings (returns to the entry to the minefield).  The simulation also 
provides the distribution of the distance traveled in the minefield and counts of path 
retracing. 
Figures 33, 34, and 35 below show pseudo code of the MOAM model simulation.  
The simulation starts from the Proceeding Tactic. First, draw the distance to the first mine, 
NOMBO, and false alarm.  If the shortest distance among these is greater than L, the loop 
finishes. Or, according to the probability of detecting mine and NOMBO, and the 
occurrence of a false alarm, the ship will execute the first avoiding tactic (travel to the 
right to avoid the object) or be exploded.  The second avoiding tactic (travel in the other 
direction to avoid the object) is executed when the first avoiding tactic is unsuccessful 
50 
(encounter an object and detect it) and the ship is not exploded by the mine.  If the second 
avoiding tactic is also unsuccessful and the ship is not exploded by the mine, the ship will 
go back to the entry to the field and start over again.  To obtain output statistics with 
small standard errors, the simulation is replicated 10,000 times in each run.  
 
 
Figure 33.   Pseudo Code of MOAM Model Simulation (Proceeding Tactic ). 
 
Distance need is L (Y axis) 
Width of mine actuation is w 
 
lM = E[ # mines / unit area] 
lO = E[ # of NOMBOs / unit area] 
lF = E[ # false Alarms / unit area] 
 
Pd(M) = Probability of detecting mine 
Pd(O) = Probability of detecting NOMBO 
 
Draw distance to 1st mine is DM 
Draw distance to 1st NOMBO is DO 
Draw distance to 1st false alarm is DF 
Draw distance to 1st mine in avoiding direction is DM2 
Draw distance to 1st NOMBO in avoiding direction is DO2 
Draw distance to 1st false alarm in avoiding direction is DF2 
Avoiding Distance is DT2 
 
DM ~ exp mean 1/(lM*w),   DM2 ~ exp mean 1/(lM*w) 
DO ~ exp mean 1/(lO*w),   DO2 ~ exp mean 1/(lO*w) 
DF ~ exp mean 1/(lF*w),   DF2 ~ exp mean 1/(lF*w) 
 
Do 
If Min(DM, DO, DF) > L 
Finish 
Else if DM  £  Min(DO, DF) 
Uniform(0, 1) £ Pd(M)    then draw new DM2, DO2, DF2 
Go to first avoiding tactic 
Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(M) 
blowUp 
Else If DO £  Min(DM, DF) 
Uniform(0, 1) £ Pd(O)    then draw new DM2, DO2, DF2 
Go to first avoiding tactic 
Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(O)    then draw new DO ( DO = DO  + new DO ) 
Go to Proceeding tactic 
Else If DF £  Min(DM, DO) then draw new DM2, DO2, DF2 
Go to first avoiding tactic 
Until(Finish or Blow up) 
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Figures 34 and 35 below display the Pseudo Code of the MOAM Model 
Simulation (first avoiding tactic and second avoiding tactic respectively).  
 
Figure 34.   Pseudo Code of MOAM Model Simulation (First Avoiding Tactic ). 
 
 
Figure 35.   Pseudo Code of MOAM Model Simulation (Second Avoiding Tactic). 
If Min(DM2, DO2, DF2) > DT2    then draw new DM, DO, DF  
( DM,O,F = old DM + new DM,O,F ) 
Go to proceeding tactic 
Else if DM2 £ Min(DO2, DF2) 
Uniform(0, 1) £ Pd(M)    then draw new DM2, DO2, DF2 
Go to second avoiding tactic 
Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(M)     
blowUp 
Else if DO2 £ Min(DM2, DF2) 
Uniform(0, 1) £ Pd(O)   then draw new DM2, DO2, DF2 
Go to second avoiding tactic 
Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(O)   then draw new DO2 ( DO2 = old DO2 + new DO2 ) 
Go to first avoiding tactic 
Else if DF2 £ Min(DM2, DO2)   then draw new DM2, DO2, DF2 
Go to second avoiding tactic 
If Min(DM2, DO2, DF2) > DT2   then draw new DM, DO, DF  
( DM,O,F = old DM + new DM,O,F ) 
Go to proceeding tactic 
Else if DM2  £  Min(DO2, DF2) 
Uniform(0, 1) £ Pd(M)  
return, draw new D, and enter again 
Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(M)    
blow up 
Else if DO2  £  Min(DM2, DF2) 
Uniform(0, 1) £ Pd(O)    
return, draw new D, and enter again 
Uniform(0, 1) > Pd(O)   then draw new DO2 ( DO2 = old DO2 + new DO2 ) 
Go to second avoiding tactic 
Else if DF2  £  Min(DM2, DO2)  
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VI. INITIAL ANALYSIS OF THE SIMULATION FOR THE 
MINEFIELD OBJECT AVOIDANCE MANEUVER MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares the simulation results with a numerical example using the  
analytical MOAM model.  The fraction of replications resulting in successful minefield 
transit is compared to the analytical probability of a safe minefield transit.  This is 
computed for the mine-only case, mine + NOMBO case, and mine + NOMBO + false 
alarm case respectively. The probabilities of a false alarm used in the models appear in 
Table 48 in Appendix A. All simulation runs have 10,000 replications. 
B. PROBABILITY OF SAFE MINEFIELD TRANSIT 
The tables below show the output of the analytical SMT model. 
 
lambdaM 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
distance 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
width 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
GammaD 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.024 0.033 0.043 0.054 0.067 
Beta(D) 0.741 0.760 0.779 0.798 0.818 0.837 0.856 0.875 0.894 0.914 0.933 
Theta 0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000 
P(S) 0.165 0.190 0.219 0.255 0.299 0.354 0.424 0.513 0.630 0.785 1.000 
P(F) 0.835 0.810 0.781 0.745 0.701 0.646 0.576 0.487 0.370 0.215 0.000 
Table 21. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Mine Only Case). 
 
lambdaM 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
lambdaO 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
distance 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
width 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
GammaD 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.022 0.038 0.058 0.082 0.108 0.138 0.169 0.204 
Beta(D) 0.741 0.756 0.768 0.778 0.786 0.792 0.796 0.798 0.799 0.798 0.796 
Theta 0.000 0.182 0.333 0.462 0.571 0.667 0.750 0.824 0.889 0.947 1.000 
P(S) 0.165 0.181 0.201 0.226 0.257 0.297 0.350 0.422 0.526 0.692 1.000 
P(F) 0.835 0.819 0.799 0.774 0.743 0.703 0.650 0.578 0.474 0.308 0.000 
Table 22. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Mine and NOMBO Case). 
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Table 23. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Mine, NOMBO, and False Alarm Case). 
 
lambdaM 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
distance 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
width 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pd(M) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
P(S) 0.165 0.198 0.237 0.284 0.340 0.407 0.487 0.583 0.698 0.835 1.000 
P(S)=exp(-lambdaM*L*w(1-Pd(M)))       
Table 24. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit (Optimistic Case). 
 
The rate of occurrence of mines and NOMBOs used in this analysis is 0.3 
mines/mile2.  The minefield distance is 6 miles and the width of the mine actuation is 1 
mile.  As mentioned previously, the ROC curve model determines the rate of occurrence 
of false alarms in Table 23 [Appendix A].  The probabilities of mine detection and 
NOMBO detection are assumed equal, i.e., Pd(M) = Pd(O) = Pd.  When the ship detects 
some object in the water, the ship evades the object without classification. 
The outputs are compared to an optimistic case which appears in Equation (2).  
Table 24 above shows the probability of a safe minefield transit for the optimistic case.  
lambdaM 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
lambdaO 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
lambdaF 0 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.017 0.029 0.043 0.062 0.091 0.152 1.101 
distance 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
width 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
GammaD 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.024 0.042 0.068 0.097 0.131 0.179 0.239 0.668 
Beta(D) 0.741 0.755 0.767 0.775 0.781 0.781 0.780 0.775 0.757 0.729 0.332 
Theta 0.000 0.185 0.340 0.474 0.585 0.687 0.769 0.840 0.905 0.958 1.000 
P(S) 0.165 0.181 0.200 0.223 0.252 0.285 0.331 0.394 0.474 0.611 1.000 
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Figure 37.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit in SMT Model (Analytical Model). 
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Figure 36 shows four cases of the probability of a safe minefield transit  in the 
MOAM model.  As can be seen in the above graph, the probability of a safe minefield 
transit decreases when NOMBOs exist in the minefield and false alarms occur, and 
increases when the probability of detection increases.  Compared to the probability of a 
safe minefield transit in the SMT model, the probability of safe minefield transit in the 
MOAM model is increased.  Also, when NOMBOs exist in the minefield and false 
alarms occur, the probability of safe minefield transit in the MOAM model is 
significantly bigger than that in the SMT model given that the probability of detection is  
the same.  Table 25 below shows the estimates of the probabilities that the ship transits 
the minefield safely for the MOAM model simulation. Input parameters of the simulation 
are the same as those of the analytical model.  The number of simulation replications is 
10,000 for each case.  The confidence interval estimates are obtained using a normal 
approximation, (Devore, 2000) 
 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
+.95 
CI 0.171 0.196 0.224 0.258 0.307 0.363 0.440 0.524 0.635 0.787 1.000 
- .95 
CI 
0.157 0.181 0.208 0.241 0.289 0.345 0.421 0.504 0.616 0.771 1.000 




Err 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.000 
Analytical Mean 0.165 0.190 0.219 0.255 0.299 0.354 0.424 0.513 0.630 0.785 1.000 
+.95 
CI 
0.171 0.188 0.204 0.228 0.271 0.307 0.358 0.422 0.533 0.699 1.000 
- .95 
CI 0.157 0.173 0.189 0.212 0.253 0.289 0.339 0.403 0.513 0.681 1.000 




Err 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 
Analytical Mean 0.165 0.181 0.201 0.226 0.257 0.297 0.350 0.422 0.526 0.692 1.000 
+.95 
CI 
0.171 0.188 0.204 0.228 0.257 0.292 0.345 0.410 0.489 0.624 1.000 
- .95 
CI 0.157 0.173 0.189 0.212 0.240 0.275 0.326 0.391 0.470 0.605 1.000 






Err 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 
Analytical Mean 0.165 0.181 0.200 0.223 0.252 0.285 0.331 0.394 0.474 0.611 1.000 
Table 25. Estimate of Probability of Safe Minefield Transit in MOAM Model (Simulation). 
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Figure 38 below shows the mean probability of a safe minefield transit in the 
MOAM model and 95% CI graphically.  For all cases, the analytical probabilities are 



























Figure 38.   Estimate of Probability of Safe Minefield Transit in MOAM model and 95% 
CI. 
 
C. OTHER SIMULATION RESULTS 
1. Conditional Mean Distance Traveled Given Unsuccessful Transit 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.99 
+.95 CI 2.173 2.306 2.455 2.626 2.784 3.091 3.326 3.677 4.098 4.661 5.472 
- .95 CI 2.104 2.233 2.376 2.541 2.690 2.982 3.196 3.520 3.887 4.357 4.379 




Err 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.018 
+.95 CI 2.173 2.387 2.589 2.907 3.193 3.678 4.489 5.444 7.034 9.385 14.75 
- .95 CI 2.104 2.312 2.504 2.807 3.075 3.531 4.291 5.185 6.651 8.727 12.36 




Err 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.030 
+.95 CI 2.173 2.355 2.584 2.855 3.323 3.919 4.714 6.000 8.757 14.33 284.9 
- .95 CI 2.104 2.280 2.500 2.757 3.198 3.760 4.501 5.699 8.273 13.41 269.2 






Err 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.057 






























Figure 39.   Conditional Mean Distance Traveled Given Unsuccessful Transit and 95% CI. 
 
Table 26 and Figure 39 above show the conditional mean distance traveled given 
an unsuccessful minefield transit as the probability of detection increases.  In this case, 
the results do not exist when the probability of detection is 1.0.  Therefore, the probability 
of detection 0.99 is used instead of 1.0 to obtain the extreme results.  The conditional 
mean distance traveled given unsuccessful minefield transit increases as the probability 
of detection increases and it increases quickly when NOMBOs and false alarms exist. 
Figures 40 and 41 are the histograms of the distance traveled given unsuccessful 
transit, when mines and NOMBOs exist in the field and no false alarms occur.  Two cases 
(low and high rates of occurrence of NOMBOs in the minefield) are compared to study 
how the NOMBO acts on the minefield travel distance given unsuccessful transit.  All the 
assumptions  are same as those used in this chapter except that the width of mine 
actuation is 0.5 miles. The low (respectively high) rate of occurrence of the NOMBOs is 
0.3 (respectively 1.5). 
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It is noted that the distances captured in the simulation are optimistic.   At each 
maneuver, the distance calculated in the simulation doesn’t count the offset w/2 distance 
units left or right of the original track until the transiting ship enters a non-overlapping 
area of the minefield.   Nor do the simulation models count actual distance a real ship 














Figure 40.   Histogram of Distance Traveled Given Unsuccessful Transit, L=6, w=0.5, 














Figure 41.   Histogram of Distance Traveled Given Unsuccessful Transit, L=6, w=0.5, 
Ml =0.3, Ol =1.5, Fl =0.0, Pd=0.7. 
60 
The total number of observations displayed in Figure 40 is 2543 and in Figure 41 
is 3278.  The mean and maximum distances traveled as displayed in Figure 40 are 3.26 
miles and 20.25 miles, and in Figure 41 are 5.54 miles and 42.44 miles, respectively.  
This demonstrates that, when the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs increases in the 
minefield, the mean and maximum distances traveled also increase.  
2. Conditional Mean Distance Traveled Given Successful Transit 
Table 27 and Figure 42 below show the conditional mean distance traveled given 
a successful transit, as the probability of detection increases.  The mean distance traveled 
given successful transit increases as the probability of detection increases.  According to 
the ROC curve model, when the probability of detecting a mine (Pd(M)) is 1, the 
probability of a false alarm (Pf) is almost 1.  As a result, the rate of a false alarm (lF) 
becomes 1.101, which makes the total distance extremely long. 
 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
+.95 
CI 6.000 6.166 6.376 6.517 6.750 6.988 7.258 7.622 8.013 8.592 9.260 
- .95 
CI 6.000 6.131 6.319 6.453 6.672 6.897 7.158 7.507 7.886 8.444 9.100 




Err 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
+.95 
CI 6.000 6.311 6.657 7.097 7.569 8.234 9.098 10.266 11.679 14.275 19.421 
- .95 
CI 6.000 6.258 6.579 6.985 7.423 8.048 8.857 9.977 11.342 13.851 18.864 




Err 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
+.95 
CI 6.000 6.319 6.680 7.160 7.740 8.581 9.689 11.302 14.004 20.271 596.02 
- .95 
CI 6.000 6.269 6.600 7.035 7.569 8.360 9.419 10.937 13.521 19.532 573.15 






Err 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.058 
             






























Figure 42.   Conditional Mean Distance Traveled Given Successful Transit and 95% CI. 
 
Figures 43 and 44 below display histograms of the distance traveled given 
successful transit, when mines and NOMBOs exist in the field and no false alarms occur, 
and the distance traveled is greater than the distance of the minefield.  Two cases (low 
and high rate of occurrence of NOMBOs in the minefield) are compared to study how the 
rate of occurrence of NOMBOs influences the minefield travel distance given successful 
transit. The low (respectively high) rate of occurrence of the NOMBOs is 0.3 
(respectively 1.5). 
When Ol = 0.3, the fraction of replications in which the distance traveled given 
successful transit equals to the distance of the minefield is 2,143/7,457 = 0.2874.  When 
Ol = 1.5, the fraction of replications in which the distance is equal to the distance of the 
minefield is 176/6,722 = 0.0262.  The conditional distribution of the distance traveled 
given successful transit is not that of a continuous random variable.  The replications that 
the distance traveled given successful transit equals to the distance of the minefield are 
truncated from the original data.  The resulting histograms for the remaining distance data 
appear in Figures 43 and 44.  The total number of observations displayed in Figure 43 is 
5314 and in Figure 44 is 6546.  The mean and maximum distances traveled as displayed 
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in Figure 43 are 7.04 miles and 21.36 miles, and in Figure 44 are 9.96 miles and 49.63 
miles, respectively.  This demonstrates that, when the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs in 
the minefield increases, the mean and maximum distances traveled also increase.  In the 
MOAM model, when the rate of occurrence of NOMBO increases, the mean increases 














Figure 43.   Histogram of Distance Traveled Given Successful Transit, L=6, w=0.5, 














Figure 44.   Histogram of Distance Traveled Given Successful Transit, L=6, w=0.5, 
Ml =0.3, Ol =1.5, Fl =0.0, Pd=0.7. 
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3. Mean Distance Traveled 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
+.95 
CI 2.811 3.043 3.309 3.602 3.971 4.472 5.018 5.698 6.533 7.706 9.260 
- .95 
CI 2.730 2.958 3.219 3.509 3.872 4.366 4.903 5.574 6.398 7.557 9.100 




Err 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
+.95 
CI 2.811 3.102 3.393 3.832 4.337 5.029 6.076 7.406 9.418 12.696 19.421 
- .95 
CI 2.730 3.015 3.299 3.725 4.216 4.887 5.899 7.191 9.148 12.328 18.864 





Err 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 0.0014 
+.95 
CI 2.811 3.077 3.394 3.802 4.417 5.228 6.364 8.085 11.210 17.868 596.02 
- .95 
CI 2.730 2.990 3.299 3.695 4.290 5.075 6.173 7.832 10.852 17.279 573.15 






Err 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0009 0.0015 0.0583 
             





























Figure 45.   Mean Distance Traveled and 95% CI. 
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Table 28 and Figure 45 above shows the mean distance traveled.  This mean 
distance traveled contains not only the distance traveled given successful transit but also 
the distance traveled given unsuccessful transit. 
4. Mean Number of Retracings 
Table 29 and Figure 46 below show the mean number of retracings (returns to the 
entry to the minefield) according to the probability of detection.  The mean number of 
retracings increases as the probability of detection increases.  
 
Pd 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
+.95 
CI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0016 0.0077 0.0145 0.0217 0.0363 0.0566 0.0899 0.1376 
- .95 
CI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0045 0.0101 0.0163 0.0291 0.0474 0.0783 0.1226 




Err 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0008 0.0011 0.0014 0.0018 0.0023 0.0030 0.0038 
+.95 
CI 0.0000 0.0009 0.0048 0.0148 0.0316 0.0673 0.1254 0.2099 0.3512 0.5923 1.1088 
- .95 
CI 0.0000 0.0001 0.0024 0.0104 0.0250 0.0573 0.1110 0.1909 0.3250 0.5551 1.0500 





Err 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 0.0026 0.0037 0.0048 0.0067 0.0095 0.0150 
+.95 
CI 0.0000 0.0009 0.0049 0.0162 0.0420 0.0859 0.1649 0.2984 0.5756 1.2525 118.59 
- .95 
CI 0.0000 0.0001 0.0025 0.0116 0.0342 0.0743 0.1485 0.2744 0.5390 1.1873 113.96 






Err 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006 0.0012 0.0020 0.0030 0.0042 0.0061 0.0094 0.0166 1.1806 
             




































Figure 46.   Mean Number of Retracings in the Minefield and 95% CI. 
 
D. DISCUSSION 
Using the probability of a safe minefield transit (as a function of the probability of 
mine and NOMBO detection) as the MOE, the simulation output compares well to the 
analytical SMT model.  The analytical calculation results are within the 95% confidence 
interval of the simulation outputs with the same input.  This suggests the simulation is 
consistent with the analytical SMT model for these parameters.  
Additionally, comparing the MOAM model to the SMT model, the more 
sophisticated maneuver of the MOAM model results in a larger probability of survival.   
The probability of a safe minefield transit of the MOAM model is significantly higher, 
when the probability of detection is the same, and the mean distance traveled given 
successful transit and the mean number of retracing in the minefield is significantly lower.  
Thus, the representation of a more realistic maneuvering tactic is important in the 
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VII. EFFECT OF THE NOMBO AND FALSE ALARM ON THE 
SAFE MINEFIELD TRANSIT IN MOAM MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the effects of the NOMBOs and false alarms on the 
probability of safe minefield transit in the MOAM model.  This is accomplished by 
varying the rate of the occurrence of the NOMBOs ( )Ol  and the detection index (d) 
respectively and is compared with a no sensor case when a ship transits the minefield 
along a direct, straight line without a sensor.  If a probability of a safe minefield transit 
(P(S)), when using a sensor, is less than or equal to that in a no sensor case, there is no 
benefit to the ship using a sensor to transit the minefield.  The avoiding distance ( )h  is 
the same as the mine actuation width of the ship (w) in this model.  The rate of 
occurrence of NOMBOs ranges from 0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1.  The detection index 
ranges from 0 to 10.0.  On the intervals 0 to 1.0, the increments are 0.2.  On the intervals 
2.0 to 10.0, the increments are 2. The probabilities of a false alarm used in the models 
appear in Table 48 in Appendix A. The Measure of Effectiveness under investigation is 
the probability of a safe minefield transit, and if and how the change of rate of the 
occurrence of NOMBOs ( )Ol  or detection index (d) affects this probability.  The 
analytical model in equation (3) is used to obtain the results in this section.  However, the 
results could also have been obtained using the simulation. 
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B. INPUT PARAMETERS 






width of ship (w), 
Avoiding Dist( h ) 
Rate of Mine 
( )Ml  
Rate of 
NOMBO 




Mine Only 6 .5, 1.0 0.1 :  1.0 0 - 
Mine & 
NOMBO 6 1.0 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 0.0 :  1.0 - 
Mine & False 
Alarm 6 1.0 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 0 0.0 :  10.0 
Mine, NOMBO 
& False Alarm 6 1.0 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 .6 0.0 :  10.0 
      
Table 30. Input Parameters for Each Environment. 
Input parameters of the MOAM model are different from those of SMT model, 
because, if the latter is used in the MOAM model, the case that the probability of a safe 
minefield transit with a sensor is less than or equal to that with no sensor never happens. 
C. OUTPUTS 
1. Mine Only Case 
Probability of Detection lambdaM 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.1 0.741 0.763 0.786 0.809 0.834 0.859 0.885 0.912 0.941 0.970 1.000 
0.2 0.549 0.581 0.616 0.653 0.693 0.735 0.781 0.830 0.883 0.939 1.000 
0.3 0.407 0.442 0.482 0.525 0.573 0.627 0.686 0.752 0.826 0.908 1.000 
0.4 0.301 0.336 0.376 0.421 0.473 0.532 0.601 0.680 0.771 0.877 1.000 
0.5 0.223 0.255 0.293 0.337 0.389 0.450 0.524 0.612 0.717 0.845 1.000 
0.6 0.165 0.193 0.227 0.268 0.318 0.380 0.455 0.548 0.665 0.812 1.000 
0.7 0.122 0.146 0.176 0.213 0.260 0.319 0.393 0.490 0.615 0.779 1.000 
0.8 0.091 0.111 0.136 0.169 0.211 0.266 0.339 0.435 0.566 0.746 1.000 
0.9 0.067 0.084 0.105 0.134 0.171 0.222 0.290 0.385 0.519 0.712 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.063 0.081 0.105 0.138 0.184 0.248 0.339 0.474 0.677 1.000 
            





























Figure 47.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=0.5, Ol =0.0. 
 
Probability of Detection lambdaM 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.1 0.549 0.580 0.613 0.649 0.688 0.730 0.775 0.825 0.878 0.936 1.000 
0.2 0.301 0.333 0.369 0.411 0.460 0.517 0.583 0.661 0.754 0.865 1.000 
0.3 0.165 0.190 0.219 0.255 0.299 0.354 0.424 0.513 0.630 0.785 1.000 
0.4 0.091 0.107 0.128 0.155 0.189 0.236 0.298 0.384 0.509 0.696 1.000 
0.5 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.092 0.117 0.152 0.202 0.277 0.395 0.598 1.000 
0.6 0.027 0.034 0.042 0.054 0.071 0.095 0.132 0.191 0.293 0.493 1.000 
0.7 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.042 0.058 0.083 0.127 0.207 0.386 1.000 
0.8 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.018 0.024 0.034 0.051 0.081 0.139 0.286 1.000 
0.9 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.020 0.030 0.049 0.089 0.199 1.000 
1.0 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.018 0.029 0.055 0.131 1.000 
            





























Figure 48.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ol =0.0. 
 
Tables 31 and 32 and Figures 47 and 48 above are generated from the results of 
those simulation runs.  The probabilities of a safe minefield transit are plotted.  Tables 31 
and 32 show the statistics for various Ml .  The probabilities clearly show a pattern.  When 
the probability of detection increases and the rate of occurrence of deployed mines 
decreases, the probability of a safe minefield transit increases.  In addition, there is no 
probability of a safe minefield transit with a sensor that is less than that of a no sensor 
case, which means that, whenever a ship uses a sensor, the probability of a safe minefield 
transit never decreases.  Thus, it is beneficial to the ship to use a sensor, even when the 
probability of detection of the sensor is low while transiting the minefield in this case in 
which there are no NOMBOs and no false alarms. 
2. Mine and NOMBO Case 
The tables below show the probability of safe minefield transit, when the rate of 
occurrence of mines is 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7 respectively.  The rate of occurrence of 
NOMBOs ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1.  There are no false alarms. The 
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effect of the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs on the probability of a safe minefield transit 
is shown as the rate of the occurrence of mines in the field increases.  The case with a 
probability of detection equal to 0 is that a ship does not use a sensor and transits the 
minefield in a straight line. 
Probability of Detection lambdaO 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.165 0.190 0.219 0.255 0.299 0.354 0.424 0.513 0.630 0.785 1.000 
0.1 0.165 0.187 0.213 0.245 0.285 0.336 0.401 0.486 0.600 0.761 1.000 
0.2 0.165 0.184 0.207 0.236 0.271 0.317 0.376 0.455 0.566 0.731 1.000 
0.3 0.165 0.181 0.201 0.226 0.257 0.297 0.350 0.422 0.526 0.692 1.000 
0.4 0.165 0.179 0.195 0.216 0.243 0.277 0.322 0.385 0.481 0.645 1.000 
0.5 0.165 0.176 0.189 0.207 0.228 0.256 0.293 0.346 0.430 0.587 1.000 
0.6 0.165 0.173 0.184 0.197 0.213 0.234 0.263 0.305 0.375 0.519 1.000 
0.7 0.165 0.171 0.178 0.187 0.198 0.213 0.233 0.263 0.317 0.441 1.000 
0.8 0.165 0.168 0.172 0.177 0.184 0.192 0.203 0.222 0.260 0.358 1.000 
0.9 0.165 0.165 0.166 0.168 0.169 0.171 0.174 0.183 0.205 0.277 1.000 
1.0 0.165 0.163 0.160 0.158 0.154 0.150 0.147 0.147 0.156 0.202 1.000 
            
Table 33. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ml =0.3. 
Probability of Detection lambdaO 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.092 0.117 0.152 0.202 0.277 0.395 0.598 1.000 
0.1 0.050 0.059 0.071 0.087 0.108 0.138 0.181 0.247 0.354 0.550 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.057 0.068 0.081 0.099 0.125 0.161 0.217 0.311 0.495 1.000 
0.3 0.050 0.056 0.065 0.076 0.091 0.112 0.141 0.187 0.267 0.432 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.055 0.062 0.071 0.083 0.099 0.122 0.159 0.222 0.364 1.000 
0.5 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.066 0.075 0.087 0.104 0.131 0.179 0.294 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.052 0.056 0.061 0.067 0.076 0.088 0.106 0.140 0.226 1.000 
0.7 0.050 0.051 0.053 0.056 0.060 0.065 0.072 0.084 0.106 0.166 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.054 0.056 0.059 0.065 0.077 0.116 1.000 
0.9 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.049 0.055 0.077 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.039 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.050 1.000 
            
Table 34. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ml =0.5. 
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Probability of Detection lambdaO 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.042 0.058 0.083 0.127 0.207 0.386 1.000 
0.1 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.029 0.037 0.050 0.071 0.106 0.172 0.327 1.000 
0.2 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.026 0.033 0.044 0.060 0.087 0.138 0.266 1.000 
0.3 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.029 0.037 0.050 0.070 0.108 0.207 1.000 
0.4 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.022 0.026 0.032 0.041 0.055 0.082 0.154 1.000 
0.5 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.027 0.033 0.042 0.060 0.110 1.000 
0.6 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.032 0.043 0.075 1.000 
0.7 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.024 0.030 0.049 1.000 
0.8 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.020 0.031 1.000 
0.9 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.019 1.000 
1.0 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.011 1.000 
            
Table 35. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ml =0.7. 
The colored boxes in the above tables indicate that the probability of a safe 














































































Figure 51.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ml =0.7. 
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All the values located below the dotted line in the above graphs are the 
probabilities of a safe minefield transit which are less than or equal to that of the no 
sensor case.  The tables and graphs clearly indicate a pattern.  The plots of the data above 
show that a relationship exists between the probability of a safe minefield transit and the 
rate of occurrence of NOMBOs in the minefield. In addition, it is possible to determine 
that, as the rate of occurrence of mines increases, the region of the rate of occurrence of 
NOMBOs that result in the probability of a safe minefield transit when using a sensor 
falling below that of the no sensor case also increases. 
3. Mine and False Alarm Case 
The tables below display the probabilities of a safe minefield transit, when the 
rate of occurrence of NOMBOs is 0.0 and the rate of occurrence of mines is 0.2, 0.6, and 
1.0, respectively.  In addition, the rate of occurrence of false alarms is a function of the 
probability of detection and the detection index as described in Appendix A.  The 
detection index ranges from 0.0 to 10.0.  This shows the effect of occurrence of false 
alarms on the probability of a safe minefield transit as a function of the rate of occurrence 
of mines in the field.  
Table 36. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ol =0.0, Ml =0.3. 
Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.165 0.186 0.210 0.238 0.275 0.311 0.378 0.437 0.516 0.645 1.000 
0.2 0.165 0.188 0.215 0.246 0.285 0.335 0.403 0.466 0.573 0.698 1.000 
0.4 0.165 0.188 0.216 0.248 0.289 0.340 0.409 0.477 0.573 0.716 1.000 
0.6 0.165 0.189 0.217 0.250 0.292 0.340 0.409 0.486 0.586 0.732 1.000 
0.8 0.165 0.189 0.217 0.252 0.292 0.344 0.413 0.486 0.596 0.744 1.000 
1.0 0.165 0.189 0.218 0.252 0.294 0.344 0.413 0.492 0.596 0.744 1.000 
2.0 0.165 0.189 0.219 0.254 0.297 0.351 0.420 0.502 0.611 0.761 1.000 
4.0 0.165 0.190 0.219 0.255 0.299 0.353 0.423 0.510 0.623 0.775 1.000 
6.0 0.165 0.190 0.219 0.255 0.299 0.354 0.424 0.512 0.628 0.780 1.000 
8.0 0.165 0.190 0.219 0.255 0.299 0.354 0.424 0.513 0.628 0.783 1.000 
10.0 0.165 0.190 0.219 0.255 0.299 0.354 0.424 0.513 0.629 0.785 1.000 
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Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.058 0.069 0.082 0.101 0.121 0.163 0.201 0.256 0.364 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.059 0.072 0.087 0.108 0.137 0.184 0.228 0.320 0.441 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.060 0.072 0.088 0.111 0.141 0.188 0.238 0.320 0.471 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.060 0.073 0.089 0.112 0.141 0.188 0.247 0.335 0.497 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.060 0.073 0.090 0.112 0.144 0.192 0.247 0.349 0.518 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.0.60 0.073 0.090 0.114 0.144 0.192 0.254 0.349 0.518 1.000 
2.0 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.091 0.116 0.149 0.199 0.265 0.368 0.550 1.000 
4.0 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.092 0.117 0.151 0.201 0.273 0.385 0.578 1.000 
6.0 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.092 0.117 0.152 0.202 0.275 0.392 0.588 1.000 
8.0 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.092 0.117 0.152 0.202 0.276 0.393 0.593 1.000 
10.0 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.092 0.117 0.152 0.202 0.276 0.394 0.596 1.000 
            
Table 37. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ol =0.0, Ml =0.5 
 
Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.027 0.034 0.042 0.061 0.077 0.102 0.154 1.000 
0.2 0.015 0.018 0.023 0.029 0.037 0.050 0.072 0.093 0.145 0.214 1.000 
0.4 0.015 0.018 0.023 0.029 0.039 0.052 0.075 0.100 0.145 0.242 1.000 
0.6 0.015 0.019 0.023 0.030 0.039 0.052 0.075 0.106 0.157 0.267 1.000 
0.8 0.015 0.019 0.023 0.030 0.039 0.054 0.077 0.106 0.167 0.290 1.000 
1.0 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.030 0.040 0.054 0.077 0.111 0.167 0.290 1.000 
2.0 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.041 0.056 0.081 0.118 0.183 0.326 1.000 
4.0 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.042 0.057 0.083 0.124 0.198 0.360 1.000 
6.0 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.042 0.058 0.083 0.125 0.204 0.373 1.000 
8.0 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.042 0.058 0.083 0.126 0.205 0.380 1.000 
10.0 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.042 0.058 0.083 0.126 0.206 0.384 1.000 
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Figure 54.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ol =0.0, Ml =0.7. 
 
The tables and graphs clearly show the effect of false alarms on the probability of 
a safe minefield transit. As the detection index increases and the rate of occurrence of 
false alarms decreases, the probability of safe minefield transit increases. For a fixed 
probability of detection, the probability of a safe minefield transit is essentially constant 
for detection indices greater than 4. The probability of a safe minefield transit with a 
sensor is always greater than the probability of a safe minefield transit in a no sensor case. 
4. Mine, NOMBO, and False Alarm Case 
The tables below display the probabilities of a safe minefield transit when the rate 
of the occurrence of NOMBOs is 0.6 and the rate of occurrence of mines is 0.3, 0.5, and 
0.7 respectively, and the rate of occurrence of false alarms is a function of the probability 
of detection and the detection index as described in Appendix A. These results show the 
effect of NOMBOs and false alarms on the probability of a safe minefield transit as a 
function of the rate of occurrence of mines in the field. 
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Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.165 0.169 0.175 0.179 0.187 0.185 0.191 0.201 0.193 0.202 1.000 
0.2 0.165 0.172 0.180 0.187 0.199 0.212 0.218 0.236 0.261 0.287 1.000 
0.4 0.165 0.172 0.181 0.190 0.203 0.217 0.228 0.251 0.271 0.325 1.000 
0.6 0.165 0.173 0.182 0.192 0.206 0.217 0.236 0.263 0.291 0.361 1.000 
0.8 0.165 0.173 0.182 0.194 0.206 0.222 0.243 0.263 0.309 0.391 1.000 
1.0 0.165 0.173 0.183 0.194 0.208 0.222 0.243 0.273 0.309 0.391 1.000 
2.0 0.165 0.173 0.183 0.196 0.211 0.230 0.253 0.288 0.336 0.440 1.000 
4.0 0.165 0.173 0.184 0.197 0.213 0.233 0.260 0.299 0.360 0.485 1.000 
6.0 0.165 0.173 0.184 0.197 0.213 0.234 0.262 0.303 0.370 0.502 1.000 
8.0 0.165 0.173 0.184 0.197 0.213 0.234 0.263 0.304 0.372 0.511 1.000 
10.0 0.165 0.173 0.184 0.197 0.213 0.234 0.263 0.305 0.374 0.515 1.000 
            
Table 39. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ol =0.6, Ml =0.3. 
 
Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.053 0.055 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.050 0.049 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.052 0.054 0.056 0.060 0.065 0.065 0.071 0.074 0.077 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.052 0.055 0.058 0.062 0.067 0.070 0.078 0.082 0.099 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.052 0.055 0.059 0.064 0.067 0.074 0.084 0.092 0.117 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.052 0.055 0.059 0.064 0.070 0.077 0.084 0.101 0.134 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.052 0.056 0.059 0.065 0.070 0.077 0.089 0.101 0.134 1.000 
2.0 0.050 0.052 0.056 0.060 0.066 0.074 0.082 0.097 0.116 0.165 1.000 
4.0 0.050 0.052 0.056 0.061 0.067 0.075 0.086 0.103 0.131 0.199 1.000 
6.0 0.050 0.052 0.056 0.061 0.067 0.076 0.087 0.105 0.137 0.212 1.000 
8.0 0.050 0.052 0.056 0.061 0.067 0.076 0.087 0.106 0.138 0.220 1.000 
10.0 0.050 0.052 0.056 0.061 0.067 0.076 0.088 0.106 0.139 0.224 1.000 
            
Table 40. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ol =0.6, Ml =0.5. 
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Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.011 1.000 
0.2 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.020 1.000 
0.4 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.026 1.000 
0.6 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.031 1.000 
0.8 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.037 1.000 
1.0 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.028 0.037 1.000 
2.0 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.034 0.049 1.000 
4.0 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.031 0.039 0.062 1.000 
6.0 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.042 0.068 1.000 
8.0 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.032 0.042 0.072 1.000 
10.0 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.032 0.043 0.074 1.000 
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Figure 57.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit, L=6, w=1.0, Ol =0.6, Ml =0.7. 
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The colored boxes in the above tables and all the values located below the dotted 
line in the above graphs indicate that the probability of a safe minefield transit with a 
sensor is less than or equal to that with no sensor. The tables above also show that, as the 
detection index increases, the range of sensor detection probabilities for which using a 
sensor results in a smaller probability of a safe minefield transit through the field than 
that for a no sensor case becomes smaller. 
D. DISCUSSION 
In comparing the four cases, it appears that the probability of a safe minefield 
transit is highly dependent on the rate of occurrence of mines ( )Ml  in the minefield. 
Detected NOMBOs and false alarms cause the ship to travel greater distances within the 
field. Thus, it is possible for use of the sensor to decrease the probability of successful 
transit of the minefield. However, if the probability of detection is large enough, then the 
advantage of being able to detect an encountered mine outweighs the disadvantage of a 
longer distance traveled. The results also show that, for a constant probability of 
detection, the probability of a safe minefield transit is nearly constant for detection 
indices greater than or equal to 4. 
The MOAM model represents better avoidance maneuvers than that of the SMT 
model. However, results from the SMT model indicate two importance relationships.  
Increasing the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs and the false alarm rate decreases the 
probability of a successful transit.  Increasing the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs and the 
false alarm rate increases the distance traveled by the successfully transiting ship in the 
minefield.  This increased distance results in more time being spent attempting to cross 
the field.  Thus, even if the ship successfully transits the field, it may take an 
unacceptable amount of time to do so. Hence, the successful employment of mine 
avoidance tactics without a sensor that can classify mines and NOMBOs may be limited 
to those situations for which the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs and false alarm rates are 
small.  These conclusions are also suggested by the results of the more complicated 
MOAM model. The MOAM model results suggest that these conclusions will apply 
generally and are not artifacts of the model representation of the avoidance maneuvering.  
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In this study, the step of the classification of an object that is detected is not 
considered. Thus, when the ship detects something in the minefield, it just attempts to 
avoid the object detected without classification. However, the results of the mine only 
case and the mine + false alarm case can be used to study the advantage of having perfect 
classification capability for mines and NOMBOs. Because, when the ship has a sensor 
that classifies objects perfectly, even though NOMBOs exist in the minefield, the ship 
can classify those correctly and continue to proceed as if they were not there. Thus, the 
results for perfect classification are the same as those of the mine only case and the mine 
+ false alarm case. For instance, in Figure 36, when the probability of detection is 0.7, the 
probability of safe minefield transit of mine only case is 0.513, whereas that of mine and 
NOMBO case is 0.422. Here, the mine only case can be considered as a perfect 
classification case, and the mine and NOMBO case can be considered as a no  
classification case. When the ship has a perfect classification sensor, the probability of 
safe minefield transit is higher than that with no classification sensor; perfect 
classification results in an approximate 22% increase in the probability of safe transit 
over having no capability for classification. It is also noted that if the probability of 
detection is increased to 0.8, then the probability of safe minefield transit in the mine and 
NOMBO case is increased to .526, which is roughly equivalent to the improvement 
possible by adding perfect classification capability. In this manner, the model can be used 
to quantify the benefits of alternative investments in either technology that would 
increase the probability of detection or technology that adds significant classification 




VIII. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SIMPLE AND THE MOAM 
MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As studied in the previous chapter, when only mines exist in the minefield or 
mines exist and false alarms occur, the results displayed for the SMT model and MOAM 
models indicate that it is always better to use the sensor. Thus, for the purpose of 
comparing the difference between the two models, the mine + NOMBO case and the 
mine + NOMBO + false alarm case are analyzed.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine what is gained by adding more 
modeling complexity to the minefield transit model by comparing the results obtained 
with the two models to see if they are significantly different. This is accomplished by 
varying the rate of the occurrence of NOMBOs ( )Ol  and the detection index (d) 
respectively, calculating the resulting probabilities of successful transit, and comparing 
results to those with the no sensor case when a ship transits the minefield along a direct, 
straight line without a sensor.  If the probability of a safe minefield transit (P(S)) when 
using a sensor is less than or equal to that in a no sensor case exists, there is no benefit to 
the ship using a sensor to transit the minefield. The analytical models are used to get the 
results in this chapter. 
B. INPUT PARAMETERS 






width of ship (w) 
Rate of 
Mine 
( )Ml  
Rate of 
NOMBO 





NOMBO 6 .5 1.0 0.0 :  1.0 - 
Mine, NOMBO 
& False Alarm 6 .5 1.0 .6 0.0 :  10.0 
 
Table 42. Input Parameters for Each Environment. 
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C. PROBABILITY OF SAFE MINEFIELD TRANSIT 
1. Mine and NOMBO Case 
Probability of Detection lambdaO 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.070 0.080 0.095 0.116 0.149 0.208 0.344 1.000 
0.1 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.066 0.074 0.086 0.103 0.130 0.180 0.301 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.068 0.078 0.092 0.114 0.156 0.261 1.000 
0.3 0.050 0.052 0.054 0.058 0.063 0.070 0.081 0.099 0.133 0.223 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.054 0.058 0.063 0.071 0.086 0.114 0.190 1.000 
0.5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.053 0.057 0.063 0.074 0.096 0.159 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.063 0.081 0.133 1.000 
0.7 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.054 0.068 0.110 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.047 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.057 0.090 1.000 
0.9 0.050 0.046 0.042 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.040 0.047 0.074 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.045 0.040 0.037 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.039 0.060 1.000 
            
Table 43. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit by Using the SMT Model, L=6, w=0.5, 
Ml =1.0. 
Probability of Detection lambdaO 
parameter 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.063 0.081 0.105 0.138 0.184 0.248 0.339 0.474 0.677 1.000 
0.1 0.050 0.063 0.080 0.104 0.136 0.180 0.242 0.332 0.464 0.668 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.062 0.079 0.102 0.133 0.176 0.236 0.324 0.454 0.658 1.000 
0.3 0.050 0.062 0.078 0.100 0.130 0.172 0.230 0.315 0.444 0.648 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.062 0.077 0.099 0.128 0.168 0.224 0.307 0.433 0.636 1.000 
0.5 0.050 0.061 0.077 0.097 0.125 0.163 0.218 0.298 0.421 0.624 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.061 0.076 0.095 0.122 0.159 0.212 0.289 0.409 0.610 1.000 
0.7 0.050 0.061 0.075 0.094 0.119 0.155 0.205 0.280 0.396 0.596 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.092 0.117 0.151 0.199 0.271 0.383 0.580 1.000 
0.9 0.050 0.060 0.073 0.090 0.114 0.146 0.193 0.261 0.369 0.564 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.059 0.072 0.089 0.111 0.142 0.186 0.251 0.355 0.546 1.000 
            






















































Figure 59.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit by Using the MOAM Model, L=6, 
w=0.5, Ml =1.0. 
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The tables and graphs above show the probability of safe minefield transit, when 
the rate of occurrence of mines is 1.0.  The rate of occurrence of NOMBOs ranges from 
0.0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1.  There are no false alarms.  The colored boxes in the 
above table indicate that the probability of a safe minefield transit is less than or equal to 
that of a no sensor case (probability of detection = 0.0). 
Comparison of the Tables and Graphs above shows that there is no case displayed 
for the MOAM model for which it is better not to use the sensor. However since the SMT 
model assumes that the ship always returns to the entry to the field, the SMT model has 
displayed cases in which it is better not to use the sensor.  The results of the simpler SMT 
model are more pessimistic than those of the more complex MOAM model, which is not 
surprising.  This suggests that even greater complexity in maneuver modeling may be 
desirable for some purposes. 
 
2. Mine, NOMBO, and False Alarm Case 
The tables below display the probabilities of a safe minefield transit when the rate 
of the occurrence of NOMBOs is 0.6 and the rate of occurrence of mines is 1.0. The rate 
of occurrence of false alarms is a function of the probability of detection and the 
detection index as described in Appendix A.  The colored boxes in the below table 
indicate that the probability of a safe minefield transit is less than or equal to that of a no 
sensor case (probability of detection = 0.0).  
In this case, the situation is more challenging for the ship  than that of the previous 
section case, because not only is the rate of occurrence of mines high, but also false 
alarms can occur. As a result, the SMT analytical model (or simulation) has more cases 
for which the probability of a safe minefield transit with a sensor is less than or equal to 
that with no sensor than in the previous section. There is still no case displayed for the 
MOAM model for which it is better not to use the sensor.  The results of the simpler 
SMT model are more pessimistic than those of the more complex MOAM model, which 
is not surprising.  This suggests that even greater complexity in maneuver modeling may 
be desirable for some purposes. 
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Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.045 0.041 0.037 0.034 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.023 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.047 0.045 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.041 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.051 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.047 0.056 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.046 0.051 0.063 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.048 0.047 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.054 0.068 1.000 
2.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.051 0.055 0.064 0.088 1.000 
4.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.054 0.060 0.074 0.111 1.000 
6.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.062 0.078 0.122 1.000 
8.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.063 0.080 0.127 1.000 
10.0 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.063 0.081 0.130 1.000 
            
Table 45. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit by Using the SMT Model, L=6, w=0.5, 
Ol =0.6, Ml =1.0. 
 
Probability of Detection Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.050 0.060 0.073 0.089 0.113 0.140 0.181 0.240 0.318 0.463 1.000 
0.2 0.050 0.060 0.074 0.092 0.117 0.150 0.192 0.258 0.361 0.512 1.000 
0.4 0.050 0.061 0.075 0.093 0.118 0.152 0.197 0.265 0.361 0.531 1.000 
0.6 0.050 0.061 0.075 0.094 0.119 0.152 0.200 0.270 0.371 0.547 1.000 
0.8 0.050 0.061 0.075 0.094 0.119 0.154 0.203 0.270 0.379 0.560 1.000 
1.0 0.050 0.061 0.075 0.094 0.120 0.154 0.203 0.275 0.379 0.560 1.000 
2.0 0.050 0.061 0.075 0.095 0.121 0.158 0.208 0.282 0.392 0.580 1.000 
4.0 0.050 0.061 0.076 0.095 0.122 0.159 0.211 0.287 0.403 0.598 1.000 
6.0 0.050 0.061 0.076 0.095 0.122 0.159 0.211 0.288 0.407 0.604 1.000 
8.0 0.050 0.061 0.076 0.095 0.122 0.159 0.212 0.289 0.408 0.607 1.000 
10.0 0.050 0.061 0.076 0.095 0.122 0.159 0.212 0.289 0.409 0.609 1.000 
            
Table 46. Probability of Safe Minefield Transit by Using the MOAM Model, L=6, w=0.5, 
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Figure 60.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit by Using the SMT Model, L=6, w=0.5, 
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Figure 61.   Probability of Safe Minefield Transit by Using the MOAM Model, L=6, 
w=0.5, Ol =0.6, Ml =1.0. 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, two models of mine avoidance maneuvering are formulated.  One is 
the Simple Minefield Transit (SMT) Model and the other is the Minefield Object 
Avoidance Maneuver (MOAM) Model. 
In the Simple Minefield Transit (SMT) model, when the ship encounters a mine 
or NOMBO, or the sensor gives a false alarm, the ship retraces its route back to the entry 
to the minefield, moves to a different location and attempts to cross the field again along 
a straight path that does not intersect any of its previous attempts. 
In the MOAM model, when the ship encounters a detected NOMBO or mine, or 
the sensor gives a false alarm, the ship attempts to go around the location of the detected 
object. The ship goes an avoiding distance to the right (for illustration, could alternatively 
go to the left).  If the ship does not detect a NOMBO or mine, or the sensor does not give 
a false alarm and the ship survives the distance, then it once again proceeds to the end of 
the field.  If the ship encounters a detected object or mine or the sensor gives a false 
alarm while going to the right, the ship backtracks and tries an avoiding distance to the 
left; if it does not detect an object and the sensor does not give a false alarm and survives 
during this avoidance path, it once again proceeds towards the end of the field.  If the 
ship encounters a detected NOMBO or mine, or the sensor gives a false alarm in both 
directions and the ship survives, the ship goes back to the entry to the field and starts over 
again. 
The results of this study demonstrate that if NOMBOs exist in the minefield, the 
probability of a safe minefield transit does not always increase with increasing sensor 
probability of detection, but sometimes decreases. That is, since detected NOMBOs and 
false alarms cause the ship to travel greater distances within the field, it is possible for 
use of the sensor to decrease the probability of successful transit of the minefield. 
However, if the probability of detection is high enough, then the advantage of being able 
to detect an encountered mine outweighs the disadvantage of a longer distance traveled. 
When there are no NOMBOs in the field, and the probability of detection increases, even 
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if false alarms occur and the rate of occurrence of false alarms is great, the probability of 
a safe minefield transit always increases.  In other words, if it is possible to guarantee that 
no NOMBOs exist in the minefield, sensors must be used to transit the minefield, even 
though the detection index is low, because the probability of a safe minefield with a 
sensor is always greater than that with no sensor.  However, in the real world, this 
situation seldom occurs.  Thus, how can the ship transit the minefield safely?  First, the 
rate of occurrence of unknown NOMBOs in the minefield should be reduced.  The rate of 
occurrence of mines is not controllable since enemy forces deploy mines.  However, 
surveying the bottom continuously during peacetime and keeping data about location of 
objects on the bottom can reduce the rate of occurrence of unidentified NOMBOs.  Next, 
reducing the rate of false alarms can be accomplished by improving the sensor signal-to-
noise ratio. Comparison of the results for which there are only mines in the field with 
those in which there are also NOMBOs suggest that the additional ability to be able to 
classify NOMBOs is important to successful employment of a mine avoidance tactic.   
The histograms of distances traveled suggest that even if the ship successfully 
transits the minefield, it may need to transit a substantial distance while doing so. The 
distance traveled is a function of the rate of occurrence of NOMBOs and the rate of 
occurrence of false alarms. Thus, even if a ship transits the field successfully, it may not 
do so within an acceptable amount of time.  
Successful use of the mine avoidance tactic without a sensor that can accurately 
classify mines and NOMBOs may be limited to those situations for which the rate of 
occurrence of NOMBOs and false alarm rates are small. Since similar conclusions are 
obtained from both models, the results suggest that these conclusions usually apply and 
are not artifacts of the model representation of avoidance maneuvering. 
B. RECOMMENDED FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
This thesis can be used as a basis for the study of extended and enhanced models 
and minefield transit tactics. In this thesis, the capability to classify objects that is 
detected is skipped. Thus, when the ship detects something in the minefield, it must 
return to the entry to the field or attempt to avoid the object detected without 
classification. Object classification will add time to the time to transit the field. 
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Additional research can study the tradeoffs of being able to classify objects with error and 
the ability to transit the field safely in a timely manner. Also the effect of being able to 
classify objects by varying the probabilities of detection for the mines and the NOMBOs 
can be studied.10 
The models used in this thesis do not consider a speed of the ship and the 
resulting time to transit the field. Only the distance traveled is analyzed as the measure of 
effectiveness. Models can be formulated and studied that include the speed of the ship. 
The MOAM model could be enhanced so that rather than the ship always 
returning to the entry point whenever it detects something in both directions, more 
complex paths involving partial retracings are tried.  Simulation could be used to explore 
more complicated avoiding tactics, other distributions of mines and NOMBOs, more 
complicated mine actuation functions, and to assess the efficacy of the tactics in crossing 
a finite-width (rather than infinite width) minefield. 
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APPENDIX A.  ROC CURVE MODEL11 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A signal received by a sensor is not always easy to classify.  Thus, it is important 
to keep in mind that the signal must be pulled out of an underlying blanket of noise as 
shown in Figure 62 below.  Some of the thermal noise power created in the receiver will 
be amplified along with the incoming signal and may be the dominant form of noise to 
contend with where other interference, such as clutter or active jamming, is not an issue.  
Figure 62 shows that the receiver operator can increase the probability of detection by 
lowering the threshold for the minimum detectable signal.  However, lowering the 
threshold increases the chances of a noise spike being large enough to mislead the radar 
to indicate that a target has been detected, when in fact, it was only noise in the receiver.  
 
Figure 62.   Sensor Signal Threshold. 
 
As a result of these factors, detection is based on probability functions called the 
probability of detection (Pd) and the probability of false alarm (Pf), which are dependent 
on each other and the signal to noise ratio (S/N). Since Pd and Pf are always mutually 
interdependent, it is always necessary to specify them together in order to give complete 
meaning to either. 
                                                 
11 A model that computes the probability of a false alarm (Pf) based on a given probability of detecting 
a mine or NOMBO (Pd) is presented in this section (Pilnick, 2002). 
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B. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION AND FALSE ALARM 
Assume the probability of detection is Pd, when something is detected, given that 
a target is present, and the probability of a false alarm is Pf, when something is detected, 
given that a target is absent. 
{ "detect" | target present}
     = detection probability
{ "detect" | target absent}








The table below shows the probability according to the threshold of a sensor. 
 
Sensor reading Given that target present Given that target absent 
Above threshold 






è Don’t call 
“detect” 




   
Table 47. Probability According to the Threshold of a Sensor. 
 
For many sensors, there is a user-selectable tradeoff between Pd and Pf.  Pd can be 
made as close to 1 as desired, if an accompanying large Pf is acceptable.  On the other 
hand, Pf  can be made as close to 0 as desired, if an accompanying small Pd is acceptable. 
C. ROC MODEL 
A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a plot of (Pd, Pf ) pairs for a 
particular sensor. Assume that a single independent signal measurement is made.  Let s 
be the known signal (voltage level) due to the target and let N be the random (Gaussian) 
electrical noise in the receiver (a random variable), 
2Normal dist(  , )N m s:  
Let V be the voltage level present at the receiver, 
V = N, when no target is present 2Normal dist(  , )V m s:  
V = s + N, when a target is present 2Normal dist(  , )V sm s+:  
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Figure 63.   ROC Curve. 
 
Figure 64 below describes the probability distribution for the voltage level at the 
receiver, V.  
96 
 




{ "detect" | target absent}
     = { | ( , )}
1
{ "detect" | target present}






































where , known as a normalized threshold
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The detection index is a dimensionless measure of the separation of the two 
density functions.  For any specified d, a ROC curve can be generated by varying the 
dimensionless, normalized threshold x. 
 
 
Figure 65.   ROC curves for Various Detection Index (d). 
 
Note that s2 is proportional to the radar power generated and 2s  is proportional to 
noise power.  Thus, the detection index is proportional to the signal- to-noise ratio (SNR) 
at the receiver.  Doubling the SNR also doubles the detection index.  The detection index 
allows the construction of a reasonable set of ROC curves based on the single parameter 
d. 
Now, assume that n independent signal measurements are made and averaged.  
Let Vn be the average voltage level present at the receiver.  As before, let v be the 



































Figure 66.   Probability Distribution for Voltage Level at the Receiver, Vn. 
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Therefore, averaging n independent signal measurements, i.e., “processing” the 
signal, effectively increases the SNR by a factor of n. 
D. RATE OF OCCURRENCE OF FALSE ALARMS 
Let Fl  be the rate of occurrence of false alarms, 
| | ( * )
( * )
1 1
rectangle with length  and width 
| | area of 
1

































As Pf can be derived from the ROC curve, Fl  can be easily obtained. 
Probability of Detection (Pd) Detection 
Index (d) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
0.0 0.000 0.081 0.159 0.274 0.345 0.500 0.579 0.655 0.788 0.885 0.999 
0.2 0.000 0.036 0.081 0.159 0.212 0.274 0.421 0.500 0.579 0.788 0.999 
0.4 0.000 0.023 0.055 0.115 0.159 0.212 0.345 0.421 0.579 0.726 0.999 
0.6 0.000 0.014 0.036 0.081 0.115 0.212 0.274 0.345 0.500 0.655 0.999 
0.8 0.000 0.014 0.036 0.055 0.115 0.159 0.212 0.345 0.421 0.579 0.999 
1.0 0.000 0.008 0.023 0.055 0.081 0.159 0.212 0.274 0.421 0.579 0.999 
2.0 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.023 0.036 0.055 0.115 0.159 0.274 0.421 0.999 
4.0 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.023 0.036 0.055 0.115 0.212 0.999 
6.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.014 0.023 0.036 0.115 0.999 
8.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.023 0.055 0.999 
10.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.023 0.999 
            
Table 48. Probability of False Alarm by Using ROC Curve. 
 
Table 48 above displays the probabilities of a false alarm that are used in the 
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